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Preface 
This study is part of a joint project on NATO~ out-of-area problems in a 
historical perspective. The project was initiated at the Norwegian Institute for 
Defence Studies (IFS) in 1996, and received funding from the Norwegian 
Ministry of Defence in 1996 and 1997. The Norwegian Research Council and 
the British Council also provided a joint grant in 1996. The project has resulted 
in two separate but closely related studies. The first part was written by Frode 
Liland (Keeping Nato out of trouble: Naio:. non-policy on out-of-area issues 
during the Cold War, Defence Studies No. 4/1999). This is the second part, 
which covers the transformation ofNATO's 'out-of-area' policy after the end 
of the Cold War. 
The bulk of the research was carried out between November 1996 and 
March 1998 when I was engaged as a research associate at the Norwegian 
Institute for Defence Studies. Some of the writing was done later, when I was 
working at the Norwegian Ministry of Defence. It should be added that the 
views expressed throughout the study are strictly my own, and are not 
necessarily in accordance with the policy of the Norwegian Ministry of 
Defence. 
I would like to thank the following persons for valuable comments on 
earlier drafts of this study: the project supervisor, Or Mats R Berdal, my 
colleagues at the Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Sven G Holtsmarlc, 
Frode Liland, and Per Fredrik Ilsaas Pharo, the Research Director at the IFS, 
Professor Olav Riste, and the Director of the IFS, Professor Rolf Tamnes. I 
would also like to extend warm thanks to all my colleagues at the Norwegian 
Institute for Defence Studies, including those mentioned above, for providing 
a stimulating and highly enjoyable working environment. Finally, I would like 
to thank Lars 0y and Irene Kulblik for editing assistance and Kari Dickson for 
invaluable language editing, without which this manuscript could not have 
been published. 
Any errors and misjudgements are solely my responsibility. 
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Introduction 
Allied handling of conflicts outside the North Atlantic area has been a 
controversial issue since the creation of NATO. However, in spite of pressure 
from different members, a policy of non-involvement was finnly established 
during the Cold War. NATO, as such, chose to limit itself to the collective 
defence of its own territory, as formal or informal co-operation between two 
or several members in other parts of the world was kept off the NATO 
agenda. Conflicts resulting from the colonial interests of some European 
countries and the American global anti communist engagement were handled in 
accordance with this intra-Alliance understanding.' 
The end of the Cold War did not bring any immediate change to this more 
or less established agreement. As late as 1992, Nicole Gnesotto and John 
Roper summarised NATO's future role outside the Alliance area as follows: 
'To those who would have liked to see an enlargement ofNATO's 
responsibilities to out-of-area missions, the Gulf War quickly showed the 
impossibility of this; public opinion in a substantial number of European 
countries during the crisis in fact expressed strong feelings against such a 
change'. 2 Nevertheless, seven years later, NATO had several thousand troops 
on the ground in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and was heavily engaged in an extensive 
air campaign against former Yugoslavia This study tells the story of how and 
why this complete change of policy took place. It also tries to point out some 
of the implications. 
The term 'out-of-area' had a fairly clear and precise meaning in NATO 
vocabulary during the Cold War, referring primarily to events taking place 
outside the territory ofNATO's members. The only exception to this ground 
rule was events taking place in the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact-
countries, which could have a direct bearing on the Alliance. The difference 
between the NATO area and the rest of the world was embodied in the 
security guarantee formulated in NATO's Article 5, requiring all members to 
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consider attack on one state as an attack on all. At NATO's 50"' anniversary, 
this distinction seemed to have lost some of its relevance, as many argued that 
the term 'out-of-area' no longer conceptualised any clearly defined area. It 
could, for instance, well be argued that NATO had in fact guaranteed the 
safety of the new state Bosnia-Herzegovina just as finnly as if it had been 
covered by Article 5. Nevertheless, in this study, the distinction between the 
territory covered by NATO's Article 5 and 'out-of-area' territory will be 
maintained, claiming its continued relevance. It will also be argued that the 
problems connected to NATO's 'out-of-area' involvement, which prevented 
an expansion ofNATO's role during the Cold War, are as promineut now as 
then, and the solutions are far from obvious. 
The development ofNATO's 'out-of-area' engagement will be divided into 
three main phases. First, between 1990 and ·1992, NATO's traditional 
reluctance to engage in 'out-of-area' conflicts came under pressure, but 
remained largely unchanged. In 1991, NATO recognised that '[t]he 
monolithic, massive and potentially immediate threat which was the principal 
concern of the Alliance in its first forty years has disappeared. '3 Moreover, the 
dwindling of Soviet power meant that the contest for global hegemony was 
temporarily ,settled, and the United States was the only remaining super power 
with global interests and capabilities. Against this background, NATO was 
forced to undertake radical changes. As a result, NATO started to review its 
strategy, but even though the new Strategic Concept, which was adopted by 
the North Atlantic Council in November 1991, opened up for 'co-ordination in 
fields of common concern', few of the members envisioned an expanded 
'out-of-area' role for the Alliance at the time. However, the almost 
simultaneous collapse of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of war in 
Yugoslavia made NATO's new Strategic Concept outdated before it had been 
put into practice. 
Secondly, between 1992 and 1995, NATO gradually became involved in the 
war in Bosnia Throughout this period, NATO's role was to support the United 
Nations peacekeeping operation on the ground. However, through an 
incremental development, NATO's role in the joint operation gradually 
increased from the initial launching of a modest naval operation in the Adriatic 
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in 1992 to the large-scale air campaign against the Bosnian Serbs in 1995. 
Throughout this period, NATO acted more and more independently, changing 
the joint operation from peacekeeping to peace enforcement by fmally 
intervening directly in the war. 
Thirdly, since 1995, NATO has embraced a fully independent 'out-of-area' 
role. The increasing NATO influence in Bosnia culminated when NATO 
replaced the UN following the deployment of its first peacekeeping force to 
Bosnia in December 1995. The final step in this development occurred when 
NATO's members decided to use force against former Yugoslavia without the 
authorisation of the UN Security Council in March 1999. The new 'out-of-
area' role was formalised in the new Strategic Concept adopted at NATO's 
50th anniversmy summit in Washington 23-24 April 1999. 
Three main mguments will be presented in this study. First, far from being 
a result of a designed policy or conscious choices, NATO's new 'out-of-area' 
policy seems to have developed almost by accident. Each new step was 
driven by events, and appears to have been taken without full consideration of 
its potential consequences. In fact, the policy was formally formulated after it 
had been de facto implemented. Through this process, NATO has repeatedly 
backed itself into a corner, only to find itself in a situation where the credibility 
of the Alliance has become closely dependent on its ability to handle 'out-of-
area' conflicts effectively. 
Secondly, it will be argued that NATO's overwhelming militmy strength has 
proved largely ineffective in relation to many of the challenges posed by 
internal conflicts such as Bosnia In fact, the use of massive force may in 
many instances be counterproductive with regard to the overall goals of the 
operation. 
Thirdly, as it is not possible to argue that NATO is defending the territory 
of a member state in any 'out-of-area' conflict, force must be used in defence 
of some other particular Alliance interest. The vision of an interest-based 
Alliance was launched in a speech by NATO's Secretmy General Manfred 
Wllmer to the North Atlantic Assembly in November 1990. In his speech 
Wllrner asked whether it was not possible to 'develop an internal Alliance 
understanding whereby ... the degree of engagement in dealing with a given 
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[out-of-area] problem might vmy from Ally to Ally, but the assets of the 
Alliance would be available for co-ordination and support'. But in the same 
speech Wllmer also recognised that 'This would operate where there is a clear 
needfor common alliance interests to be defonded'.' Balancing these two 
potentially conflicting needs - allowing some members to use common assets, 
but only in defence of common alliance interests - remains the essence of the 
dilemma ofNATO's post-Cold War transformation. 
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1990-1992: Cold War aftermath 
Introduction 
The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact at the summit meeting in Prague on 1 July 
1991, and the collapse of the Soviet Union the following December have been 
said to symbolise NATO's victory in the Cold War. However, even before the 
Soviet Union collapsed, the war against Iraq and the inclusion of former East 
Germany into NATO made it evident that NATO's old 'glue', the common 
threat from a hostile Soviet Union, had changed beyond recognition. In the 
early 1990s, many saw these events as depriving NATO of its basis for 
existence. It was clear that fundamental changes had to be made, but there 
was also initially considerable confusion over what these changes implied for · 
NATO and the West. The issue of 'out-of-area' operations soon appeared, but 
there was little eagerness among most ofNATO's members to engage the 
Alliance outside the NATO area, as they probably recognised the difficulties 
inherent in this new role. 
The Gulf War has sometimes been referred to as the first informal NATO 
'out-of-area' operation. However, this perception is misconceived, as NATO 
policy fQllowed established Cold War procedures (seep 14-23}, and the 
' Alliance as such was only margjnally involved. Nevertheless, the measures 
taken both by NATO and the US-led coalition provided some valuable lessons 
with regard to both the problems and benefits connected to engaging NATO 
outside the treaty area, and will thus be thoroughly discussed. 
Whereas NATO's new Strategic Concept of November 1991 made no 
direct reference to a new 'out-of-area' role, it will be argued that the 
escalating war in Yugoslavia led to mounting pressure on NATO, making it 
practically impossible to adhere to the old rules. Given the vital importance of 
the Yugoslav wars for the development ofNATO's 'out-of-area' policy, a brief 
background to the outbreak of these wars and the initial international response 
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will be presented. It will be argued that the Western states' inability to agree on 
a common response to the war in Bosnia led to the introduction ·of measures 
designed mainly to show that something was being done, rather than an 
adequate rnilital)' response, if such a response could be found, to the 
problems at hand. NATO's first 'out-of-area' operation, deployed in close 
competition with the Western European Union, was one such measure. 
Defining a new role for NATO -the initial steps 
The inclusion of the former German Democratic Republic in NATO, following 
German unification, in itself resulted in a radical change in NATO's 
geographical scope. The speed of the unification process was both 
unpredicted and unprecedented and demonstrated that profound changes were 
taking place in East-West relations. In January 1990, the German Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Hans Dietrich Genscher, stated: 'To think that the borders of 
NATO could be moved 300 kilometres eastwards, via German unification, 
would be an illusion .... No reasonable person could expect the Soviet Union 
to accept such an outcome.'' Eight months later the unification was formally 
passed, and the Soviet Union had agreed to the Helsinki Act principle that 
every state has the right to choose its own alignment. In September 1994, the 
former East German forces were integrated into NATO's milital)' command. 
German unification also prompted the first official signals of radical 
change in NATO's tasks and strategy. In order to reassure the Soviet Union, 
NATO issued the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic 
Alliance at a meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) on 5-6 July 1990. 
In the London Declaration, NATO extended 'a hand of friendship' to its 
former adversaries. More specifically, it was an invitation to the Soviet Union, 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria and Romania to establish regular 
diplomatic liaisons with NATO, in addition to closer rnilital)' contact. 
Furthermore, NATO intended to undertake a fundamental change in the 
Alliance's integrated force structure and strategy to reflect a reduced reliance 
on nuclear weapons, which were to be truly weapons of last resort. 
The preparations for the London Summit focused largely on the unification 
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of Gennany and the Soviet response. It had become clear that unification was 
imminent, and there had been intense negotiations with the Soviet Union over 
the last six months. Prior to the summit, the Soviet Union had emphasised the 
importance of a visible change in NATO policy. 6 The United States and West 
Gennany, which led the unification process, therefore needed to make an 
ambitious declaration. There was already growing concern in Washington that 
Gorbachev's charm offensive towards the West and the diminishing Soviet 
threat could lead to a fragmentation ofNAT0.7 This meant that it was 
important to preserve unity at the meeting. Due to the somewhat 
contradictory nature of these demands, Washington decided to ignore NATO's 
nonnal consultative procedures and drew up a draft declaration, which was 
presented a few days prior to the sununit. The draft was adopted more or less 
unchanged, despite strong French and British opposition to many of the main 
points. 
The Declaration made it clear that radical change was to be expected 
without specifying new structures or policies, but the overall goal of 
reassuring the Soviet Union was largely achieved. While the Declaration 
denounced the old threats that had been NATO's raison d'etre for the last 40 
years, no new threats were identified. Questions were bound to be raised 
concerning the fundamental purpose of an Alliance which had not identified 
any precise threats, but the expansion of Alliance responsibilities beyond the 
treaty area was clearly not an issue at this point, primarily for fear of 
provoking the Soviet Union. However, the situation changed rapidly following 
the outbreak of the Gulf War. 
The Gulf War- NATO's geographical scope Is challenged 
The first post-Cold War conflict directly affecting NATO's members erupted 
only a few days after the London Sununit, when Iraq invaded Kuwait on 2 
August 1990 .. The Gulf War, which started five months later, was fought 
between Iraq and a broadly based, US-led 'coalition of the willing'. The 
mandate issued by the UN Security Council authorised 'Member States co-
operating with the Government of Kuwait' to use 'all necessary means' to 
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ensure that Iraq withdrew from Kuwait. 8 The United States accounted for 70 
per cent of the coalition forces, with a force consisting of more than 500,000 
troops, 2,000 tanks, and I ,800 aircraft. Other major contributors were Saudi 
Arabia (94,000 troops), the United Kingdom (42,000 troops), Egypt (40,000 
troops), and France (20,000 troops).' Following an intense build-up and 
several months in preparing for war, the first air attacks were launched on 16 
January 1991. The extensive air campaign was followed by a major ground 
offensive, which started on 24 February, and on 3 March 1991 Iraq 
capitulated unconditionally. 
Even though NATO, as such, was only marginally involved, the war 
brought the 'out-of-area' issue to the midst ofNATO's agenda. With the 
benefit of hindsight, it may be argued that the international consteilations 
which appeared during the Gulf War made it necessary for NATO to 
reconsider its 'out-of-area' policy. First, the fact that the Soviet Union 
supported the US-led international coalition which was fighting against a 
Middle East country, made it evident that the Soviet Union was no longer the 
enemy it had been during the Cold War. Following on from that, the threat 
perception had to change. It was recognised that future threats to European 
security may not be in the fonn of a direct attack on one or several NATO 
members, but rather in the fonn of instability outside the NATO area which 
could affect the allies directly or indirectly. Secondly, the fact that the 
exceptional nature of the political and military conditions prevalent during the 
war was grossly underestimated, also affected NATO's 'out-of-area' policy 
discussion. The post-Cold and Gulf War euphoria led to unrealistic 
expectations of a new era in which effective collective security institutions 
would be able to resolve international conflicts, and NATO had to define its 
new role within this framework. 
What role did NATO actually play? 
Though not directly involved, the Alliance did play a distinctive role in the war 
through its contributions to the coalition effort and through its own 
operations. However, the procedures followed did not in any way conflict 
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with NATO members' infonnal rules for 'out-of-area' deployment, developed 
during the Cold War. 
US pressure on European allies to take a more active global role had been 
on the increase since the early 1980s following the invasion of Afghanistan by 
the Soviet Union.10 Washington started implicitly and explicitly to link the 
continued presence of US troops in Europe with future European support for 
US military involvement outside the NATO area. 11 The US demands were 
accommodated in a new 'consultation-facilitation-compensation' funnula, 
which was intended to make NATO more adept in handling the commitments 
of important members outside the Treaty area. The more formal procedures 
for 'consultation' were based on the recognition that NATO's concept of 
security had to be broadened to allow for common NATO statements 
regarding conflicts which involved only some of the allies. 'Facilitation' 
entailed the need for NATO to maintain sufficient military strength within the 
Treaty area to ensure a credible defence in the event that the United States and 
selected NATO powers had to redeploy their forces outside the NATO area. 
Finally, 'compensation' entailed that any logistical differences and shortfalls in 
manpower arising from the redeployment of US combat troops, originally 
, designated for NATO defence reinforcement, to Southwest Asia, were to be 
covered by the European members.12 
Allied contributions to the coalition 
These measures were implemented during the build-up of coalition forces in 
Saudi Arabia in the autumn of 1990 and during the I 00-day war at the start of 
1991, though not without provoking some transatlantic tension. At a meeting 
ofthe North Atlantic Council on 10 September 1990, the US Secretary of 
State, James Baker ill, announced that, in addition to financial contributions, 
the United States would welcome the deployment of allied troops to Saudi 
Arabia. Four days later Britain ordered its 7thAnnoured Brigade to the Gulf 
and France announced its own operation. Italian and Turkish bases were also 
used by the Americans fur Gulf operations. France offered over-flying rights 
and refuelling facilities for US B-52s. The smaller contributions made by other 
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NATO allies were of more political than military significance. Gennany did not 
participate in the coalition forces at all, as the deployment of Gennan forces to 
the Gulf was deemed to contravene the Gennan constitution. However, a 
substantial part of the US command, control and communication network for 
'out-of-area' operations in the Mediterranean was operated through Gennany. 
In this respect, the Gulf War followed a Cold War pattern in which Gennany 
was repeatedly used as a logistical base and command centre for US military 
action. Furthennore, US, British and Canadian deployments to Saudi Arabia 
included troops and equipment stationed in Germany for defence purposes. 
Germany provided extensive support for the movement of these troops and 
some of its reserves were activated to manage the logistical tasks." Large 
amounts of Gennan ammunition were also shipped from Gennany to the 
coalition forces in the Gulf. 
NATO operations 
NATO as an organisation also launched its own separate operation. Operation 
Southern Guard comprised two main elements. The first, Operation Med Net, 
was an air and naval operation, designed to detect and deter troublemakers on 
sea and air routes in the Mediterranean. Operation Med Net was a training and 
surveillance operation and was not directed against any specific adversary. It 
was justified as a prudent measure in the light of events taking place along the 
boundaries of the Southern Region ofNATO. 
Even though the second element was directly linked to NATO's core 
function, it still provoked difficulties within the Alliance. On 17 December 
1991, 'Twkey asked for assistance and requested that NATO's Mobile Air 
Force should be deployed along the eastern border with Iraq. The reason for 
this request was that Iraq had threatened to retaliate against Turkey if US air 
attacks on Iraq were launched from Turkish bases. On 2 January 1992, 
NATO's Defence Planning Committee approved the request and launched 
Operation Dawn Set. The decision was made after some hesitation, by 
Gennany in particular. The major Gennan opposition party (the SPD) stated 
that Turkey had provoked Iraq by allowing US planes to operate from Turkish 
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bases. Any retaliation by Iraq against Turkey would therefore not qualify the 
activation ofGennany's obligation to assist in the defence of Turkey, pursuant 
to Article 5.14 Even though Gennany did finally agree to send 18 Alpha Jet 
ground attack aircraft and a supporting force of 270 men, it reserved the right 
to approve the use of these forces in the event of war. The Gennan opposition 
argued that such a commitment of forces should be approved by a two-thirds 
majority vote in the Bundestag. 15 
All in all, in addition to direct participation in the coalition, the allies 
contributed to the coalition war effort in five ways: by strengthening the 
defence of Turkey; by protecting air and sea routes in the Mediterranean 
through training and surveillance operations; by supporting coalition troops 
with logistics and transport; by compensating and replacing American troops 
in Europe who had been transferred to the Gulf; and by financial 
contributions. Nevertheless, it would be misleading to claim that the Gulf War. 
was mainly a NATO effort. US furces accounted fur the bulk of the coalition, 
and the second largest force consisted of troops from Middle East countries. 
Furthennore, the coalition was established unilaterally by the United States, 
which also commanded the operation. Even though consultations did take 
place between the NATO allies, the important decisions were made unilaterally 
by the United States. Furthennore, as the coalition force also included non-
NATO members, most consultations took place bilaterally between the United 
States and each coalition member, or in the UN. 
Sources of tension within the Alliance 
Was the Gulf War a demonstration of an infonnal, but coherent and 
successful NATO 'out-of-area' policy, or on the contrary, a display of internal 
discord despite suitable conditions for a joint operation? In order to answer 
this question one has to look at the broader picture. 
According to Michael Brenner, there has been a tendency to overlook both 
the extreme reluctance with which the United States went to war and the 
bitter recriminations that would have ensued had the human costs been 
higher.16 The reason why the Iraqi leader, Saddarn Hussein, allowed the 
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coalition four months to build up its forces undisturbed, was probably that he 
believed that the coalition would break iflraq inflicted enough damage on the 
coalition forces. But the coalition held -not only between NATO members, 
but also between NATO and its rather unlikely coalition partners. This is 
perhaps the clearest indication that the Gulf War was quite exceptional with 
regard to NATO cohesion on 'out-of-area' issues. However, the two prime 
sources of tension were familiar Cold War issues: burden-sharing within the 
Alliance, and differing national interests in the conflict area and in how the 
conflict should be solved. 
The burden-sharing issue came to a head in connection with Germany's 
contribution to the war effort. The Gennan claim that the deployment of its 
troops outside the NATO area would be unconstitutional was viewed as a 
'cheap excuse' by many of its allies. 17 Irritation increased when Gennany 
reacted slowly to the US request for financial support. On 30 August 1990, 
the Bush administration publicly requested that other countries help to bear the 
financial burden. The German government, which was preoccupied with 
unification, took two weeks to respond, causing irritation within the Alliance. I' 
In the light of the coming unification, Gennany was wary of provoking the 
Soviet Union, fearing that it might raise new objections, or withdraw its 
previous consent to unification. Another controversial issue was Gennany's 
refusal to sanction the delivery of spare parts for allied Tornadoes operating in 
the area, and to lift the ban on low-flying Tornado practice flights in 
Germany. 19 Gennany's reluctance to assist Turkey reinforced the view that 
Germany was a free rider, unwilling to deal with the uncomfortable sides of 
exercising power. 
Even though there was less dissatisfaction with the other allies, Brenner 
· argues that there was still the potential for an angry reaction by the United 
States against its allies, and that even the predicted casualty levels {which 
were much higher than the actual figures) could have ignited this anger.20 
A second source of tension was differing national interests in connection 
with the conflict, most notably between the United States and France, but also 
between the United States and Gennany. French policy during the Gulf crisis 
was a demonstration of the diplomatic art of balancing two partly 
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contradicting interests. French sensitivity to Arab interests may in part be 
explained by its Arab-speaking minority and traditional ties with Arab countries 
which were not part of the coalition, and in part by the traditional French 
stance of maintaining some distance and independence in relation to US policy. 
However, France did not want to side with Saddam Hussein against the United 
States, and at the crucial points France not only supported the coalition but 
also agreed to submit its forces to the overall US command. France tried to 
resolve these conflicting interests by attempting to link Iraqi withdrawal to 
other Arab issues. One example of this policy was the French call for free 
elections in Kuwait following an Iraqi withdrawal, instead of the unconditional 
return of the AI Sabah dynasty. 21 However, any such concessions, which 
could be interpreted as rewards to Saddam Hussein, were totally unacceptable 
to the United States. The most serious challenge to coalition unity was 
France's solo diplomacy the day before the deadline of the UN ultimatum. 
France submitted a six-point proposal to the Security Council, which linked 
Iraqi withdrawal to an international peace conference on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. The proposal was not cleared in advance with any of the NATO 
members, and was not mentioned by President Francois Mitterand at a lunch 
with the new British Prime Minister, John Major, the same day. As observed 
by Franco is Heisbourg, 'Since Iraq refosed, no harm was done in terms of 
allied solidarity. At the same time Paris could turn to the Arab world to say 
that no stone had been left unturned in the quest for peaceful resolution. '22 But 
if Iraq had accepted the offer, it would have been difficult to hold the coalition 
together, and NATO cohesion would have been undermined. The United 
States was not prepared to reward Saddam's aggression, yet France could not 
have gone to war if Iraq had accepted the peace offer. The internal cohesion 
ofNATO was therefore probably saved by Saddam Hussein's rejection. 
Why did the coalition hold? 
The overall united front, not only between NATO members but also within the 
wider coalition, shows how exceptional the situation was. The new regime in 
Moscow was an important factor in this picture. Another factor which made 
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it possible to build such a broad coalition, was the fact that the Iraqi invasion 
was a clear-eut violation of international law in a strategically important and 
very unstable area. It was the combination of such a flagrant violation of 
international law and the threat to vital national interests that offended and 
threatened both Western and Middle Eastern states. Another important factor 
was Saddam Hussein's threat to use hostages as human shields and to use 
chemical weapons. The international outcry against Iraq by state leaders and 
the general public was further fuelled by the fact that Saddam Hussein's 
campaign involved actions that could lead to an ecological disaster. Domestic 
opinion in the Western democracies was therefore likely to be more tolerant of 
both their own casualties and collateral damage.23 As it turned out, the war 
only lasted for I 00 days, and coalition casualties were far lower than 
estimated. Military conditions were favourable, with a static Iraqi force 
situated in open terrain, and largely removed from civilian structures. Before 
the war broke out, support for the use of force was low in leading opposition 
circles as well as with the general public in the United States, Germany and 
France. The German opposition's reluctance to send troops to Turkey has 
already been mentioned. France's socialist Minister of Defence, Jean-Pierre 
Chevl:nement, continued to express reservations about French participation in 
a military solution to the crisis. Jean-Marie Le Pen's right-wing party was 
against French participation, which probably prevented the emergence of a 
larger anti-war faction within the Socialist Party. When the war finally broke 
out, public support rose sharply in all coalition countries, but the opposite 
could have been the case if the war had been less successful. 
Could NATO have done lt alone? 
Even though the United States contributed the bulk of the international force, it 
was clear from the start that the cnalition against Saddam Hussein would have 
to be more than a Western alliance. Iraq had for many years enjoyed close 
relations with the Soviet Union, and a continued supply of Soviet arms to Iraq 
throughout the war could have caused tension between the Americans and a 
rapidly declining Soviet Union. Furthermore, Iraq's attack on Israel could have 
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provoked a regional war and Israeli retaliation was only avoided by US military 
countermeasures and the fact that several Arab countries (most notably Egypt 
and Saudi Arabia, but also Syria though only on a symbolic level) were 
involved in the war on the US side. The broad coalition was therefore 
necessary in order to avoid both an East-West and an Arab-Israeli conflict. 
Politically, NATO could probably not have achieved this alone. The limited air 
attacks by US and British forces against Iraq in 1998 and 1999 do not alter 
this conclusion. 
The Gulf War also revealed the Alliance's limited military capacity for 
large-scale 'out-of-area' operations. European armies, conscripted for the 
purpose of national defence, proved largely unsuitable for 'out-of-area' 
operations."' In the case of France, in particular, the refusal to use conscript 
soldiers created difficulties when setting up a sizeable, all-professional combat 
force in Saudi Arabia 25 According to Francois Heisbourg, the Gulf War 
revealed 'the patent unsuitability of France's Cold War force structure to post-
Cold War conditions'. 26 One of the many lessons for France was the lack of 
relevance of its nuclear deterrent. Another was that, bad the war dragged on 
beyond spring, the rotation of the French force would have posed real 
problems. Germany faced the same problem with a conscript-based army, in 
addition to a much stronger psychological barrier towards the use of force for . 
any purpose other than the defence of its own territory. According to Alan 
Sked, the number of Germans claiming exception from military service on the 
grounds of conscienscious objections increased by 54 per cent after the 
outbreak of the Gulf crisis; 40 pilots resisted transfer to Turkey and 7,000 
reservists were unwilling to be mobilised.27 However, Germany took important 
steps during the Gulf crisis which signalled a change in attitude. A 
minesweeping detaclnnent, in part manned by conscripts, was transferred 
from the Mediterranean to the Gulf to help clear the mined shipping lanes. For 
legal reasons this was termed a contribution to a co-ordinated 'humanitarian 
mission'. Another less controversial measure was the participation of 
Bundeswehr engineering and aviation units in attempts to control the Kurdish 
refugee crisis. In their analysis of German support to the Gulf War, Kart 
Kaiser and Claus Becher concluded: 'In Germany, therefore, the experience of 
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the Iraqi crisis worked as a catalyst for broadening the awareness of security 
challenges to industrial democracies as a whole and of the necessity for a 
German contribution to European, Western and UN approaches. '28 
The lessons of the Gulf War prepared NATO's members for future 'out-
of-area' operations. However, at the time of the Gulf War it was still not 
obvious that NATO would change its 'out-of-area' policy. Resistance to a 
redefinition ofNATO's tasks was strong both within and outside the Alliance. 
There were two main reasons for resistance: first, many members feared that 
NATO 'out-of-area' missions would weaken the cohesion of the Alliance and 
the commitment to Article 5, secondly, instability in the Soviet Union made 
any future threats from the East quite unpredictable. At the same time, the 
positive developments in East-West relations gave rise to hopes for more 
collective security arrangements under the auspices of the UN or the 
revitalised Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). 
Consequently, the conclusions drawn in the immediate aflermath of the 
Gulf War did not envisage a new 'out-of-area' role for NATO. The US 
Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Council, William Taft, argued 
that an important future task would be to extend Alliance co-operation as 
widely as possible, but added that this did not mean a formal extension of 
NATO to other areas. In June 1991 he wrote that 'NATO, as an institution, did 
not play a direct role in the Gulf, only in the defence of Turkey and this is 
likely to be the case in any similar situation in the future. '29 
Many problems remained unsolved. In the United States, the Gulf War 
only served to reinforce the public's deep-rooted conviction that it was time 
for the United States' allies to step forward and take their place in the front line 
to protect common interests. In 1991, Michael Brenner concluded: 'The 
evidence from the Gulf episode indicates that significant divisions of opinion 
go beyond thinking about 'out-of-area' situations to include more fundamental 
beliets about what constitutes acceptable international conduct and the 
acceptable means for enforcing it.' He went on to argue that 'Achieving a 
more equitable sharing of responsibilities is only possible if there is a broad 
consensus on interests, purposes and methods for realising them. '30 The 
question that remained was whether such a consensus existed. 
DEFENCE STUDIES &11999 23 
The new Strategic Concept of 1991 
By the end of the same year, in November 1991, NATO had completed its 
new Strategic Concept. In the time that had passed since the first step was 
taken at the London Summit in 1990, NATO had experienced German 
unification, the Gulf War and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. IfNATO 
were to avoid appearing outdated in relation to recent international 
developments these changes would have to be reflected in its new policy 
statement. 
The review of NATO's strategy was a thorough three-track bureaucratic 
·process which involved both civilian and military staffs. Three separate 
documents were produced: a political declaration drawn up by the NATO 
ambassadors, the new Strategic Concept negotiated by the International 
Staff's Strategy Review Group, and the 'Directive for the military 
implementation of the Strategic Concept' prepared by the permanent military 
delegations, the International Military Staff and SHAPE." Despite these 
complex and time-consuming procedures, the bulk of the Strategic Concept 
was negotiated by ministers at the North Atlantic Council meeting in 
November. 
Four main issues were discussed by all the strategy groups: (I) the 
development of a European pillar within NATO and the role of the Western 
European Union (WEU); (2) relations with former Warsaw Pact countries; (3) 
the question of how much attention should be focused on the Soviet Union; 
and ( 4) NATO's role 'out-of-area'. However, the November summit started 
without consensus, as NATO's permanent staff and bureaucracy had been 
unable to reach agreement. The following summit declaration was the first of 
many statements to reflect NATO's difficulties in agreeing on common 
formulations with regard to how the changes in its perceived threat were to be 
handled. Vague formulations which allowed for different interpretations 
papered over disagreements with regard to the future aims and tasks of the 
Alliance. Discussions were also complicated by the continued, rapid changes 
in the strategic environment in Europe, the most important probably being the 
attempted coup in Moscow in August 1991, which contributed to a continued 
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focus on the East. Consequently, at the sununit, most of the allies had not yet 
developed a concrete picture ofNATO's future role. Despite numerous 
references to the promising new age of Europe, the defmition ofNATO's core 
functions, as listed in paragraph 21 in the new Strategic Concept, was rather 
conservative. NATO's core functions were:32 
To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security 
environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions 
and the commitment to the peacefUl resolution of disputes, in which no 
country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or 
to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force. 
To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic 17eaty. 
as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that 
qffect their vital allied interests, including possible developments 
posing risks for members 'security. and for appropriate co-ordination of 
efforts in fields of common concern. 
To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the 
territory of any NATO member state. 
To preserve the strategic balance in Europe. 
The main emphasis remained on NATO's traditional role (Article 5 operations 
and strategic deterrence of the Soviet Union) as reflected in point Ill and IV. 
The carefully selected wording in point 11, which was the only reference to 
the new threats, left all options open, but 'consultation' and 'co-ordination' on 
issues of common concern was really nothing new. The explicit reference to 
Article 4 of the North Atlantic Charter also underlined continuity rather than 
change. The strongest formulation was found in a separate chapter on 
'Management of crisis and conflict prevention', in which it was stated that 
'The success of Alliance policy will require a coherent approach detennined 
by the Alliance's political authorities choosing and co-ordinating appropriate 
crisis management measures as required from a range of political and other 
measures, including those in the military field.'" 
The different positions on NATO's future role 'out-of area' were obvious 
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and predictable. France and Spain were opposed to an expanded role for 
NATO, and advocated a greater role for the Western European Union (WEU). 
Smaller members still feared that NATO's core functions would be weakened 
by an expansion of the scope. In Gennany, the use of Gennan forces outside 
the NATO area was a political non-issue. In fact, the United States and Britain 
were the only countries eager to discuss an expansion ofNATO's role. A 
compromise was found in a concept which had been introduced earlier that 
year. During the Gulf crisis in 1991, 'passive solidarity' had been launched as 
a possible approach to 'out-of-area' conflicts.34 1his entailed that allies 
operating 'out-of-area' could make use of NATO facilities such as 
infrastructure, collective equipment and co-ordinating procedures. General 
Vigleik Eide, chainnan ofNATO's Military Committee at the time, had publicly 
highlighted allied contributions to the international coalition in areas such as 
logistics and material." 'Passive solidarity' implied a small step forward in 
relation to Cold War 'out-of-area' policy, but not a radical change. In many 
ways it simply fonnalised an already agreed policy. However, despite vague 
references to phrases like 'crisis management' and 'conflict prevention' in 
connection with incidents that could develop into a direct threat, NATO would 
continue to be a collective defence organisation and the justification for its 
existence was, to a large extent, the threat posed by the Soviet Union. 
However, the inunediate collapse of the Soviet Union, and the escalating 
war in Yugoslavia made NATO's new Strategic Concept more or less out-
dated less than a year after its inception. Even though the new Concept 
opened up for 'appropriate co-ordination of efforts in fields of common 
concern', no directions were given with regard to what this really entailed. 
Therefore, when NATO declared its willingness to support the UN and the 
OSCE on a case-by-i:ase basis in June 1992, NATO took its first step into a 
new 'out-of-area' role. The fact that this decision had not been made half a 
year earlier in connection with the fonnulation of the new Strategic Concept, 
clearly indicated that NATO's new 'out-of-area' policy was a result of the 
events of the day rather than conscious choice based on a longer time 
perspective. 
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The dissolution of Yugoslavia 
NATO's future role and the wars In former Yugoslavia 
When Yugoslavia started to disintegrate in 1990-91, the initial assessment of 
most major Western powers was that the conflict was of little strategic 
significance and that national interests were not at stake. Four years later, 
however, the war in Bosnia had become 'the most challenging threat to 
existing nonns and institutions that Western leaders faced. '36 The war in 
Bosnia had also caused the deepest rifts in NATO on 'out-of-area' issues since 
the Suez crisis in 1956. Moreover, as NATO's intervention in Bosnia was the 
first armed force operation in the history of the Alliance, its military credibility 
came to depend on the success of the operation. In the absence of a uni1Ying 
external threat, NATO's first 'out-of-area operation was seen by many as a 
test case for the future integrity and viability ofNATO. The following question 
was therefore raised: 'If [NATO]leaves Bosnia without finishing the job, how 
can it be taken seriously anywhere else?' 37 Failure or success in Bosnia was 
then also linked to the resolution of all the other post-Cold War challenges 
NATO had to face. Bosnia became a test case for co-operation within the 
Partnership for Peace, with Russia, and new members. The fate of Bosnia, 
and later also Kosovo, the fate ofNATO and the enlargement process became 
closely interconnected." In the words of Richard Cohen: 'The future of 
NATO .. : is inextricably linked to what happens in Bosnia. We cannot have it 
both ways: an expanded and still-important NATO, and a failed effort in 
Bosnia.'39 
The reason why Bosnia and Kosovo became so important to NATO's 
future was explained by Robert E. Hunter, US ambassador to NATO, as 
follows: 'When I arrived [at NATO], I found the alliance drifting into 
irrelevancy because of the Bosnian conflict. It wasn't NATO's fault, but the 
perception was that NATO was failing because it wasn't halting a conflict 
threatening Europe and causing moral outrage. '40 Thus, NATO's continued 
relevance and military credibility became linked to the successful resolution of 
the conflicts in the Balkans. 
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The process of dissolution 
The forces behind Yugoslavia's dissolution have been thoroughly described 
and analysed since the first war broke out in 1991. 41 Here it suffices to 
mention the most critical factors. The decentralised federal structures adopted 
by the Yugoslav leader Josip Tito in the early 1970s made centralised decision-
making slow and cumbersome. When Yugoslavia was hard hit by economic 
recession in the 1980s, the central government was unable to respond 
effectively, primarily because the republics had diverging interests with regard 
to economic reform as their economies were so different. When Yugoslavia's 
strategic importance diminished following the end of the Cold War, Western 
financial aid dried up and the economic situation deteriorated further. Historical 
tensions between the different ethnic groups were then fuelled by leaders 
using nationalist rhetoric to rally support for their political goals. In this 
situation, Slovenia, the most economically advanced republic, correctly judged 
that Belgrade would not put up much resistance to its secession as the 
republic was ethnically homogenous. Croatia had a larger Serb minority, but 
after a short war in 1991, both Slovenia and Croatia gained international 
recognition. Thus the Bosnian Muslims had become a small minority in 
Yugoslavia dominated by an increasingly nationalistic regime in Belgrade. 
The question of whether the wars in the former Yugoslavia can be defined as 
civil wars or as wars of liberation from Serb repression, arouses strong 
emotions. But either classification would be too simplistic and unjust to the 
complexities of the many wars and conflicts which erupted throughout the 
di~,integrating state between 1991 and 1995. The first brief armed struggle 
was fought on the border between Yugoslavia and Slovenia, which unilaterally 
declared its independence on 25 June 1991. The war only lasted fur ten days 
when the Yugoslav National Army withdrew based on an agreement between 
the Yugoslav and Slovene leaders. Slovenia was the only ethnically 
homogeneous republic in Yugoslavia, and Milosevic wanted to concentrate his 
effort on areas with a Serb population. Furthermore, Germany and the United 
States, which saw the conflict as a war of independence between a Western 
democratic republic and communist repression, supported the Slovenes. A 
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cease-frre was brokered by the European Community (EC), and the 
consequences were summarised by Laura Silber and Allan Little as follows: 
Slovenia had opted for force and had won a great prize. It had taught 
Europe a lesson that the peace mediators never once took on board-
that war is sometimes not only a profoundly rational path to take, 
especially when you know you can win, but it is also sometimes the only 
way to get what you want. 42 
The second war was fought between Yugoslavia and Croatia during the 
autumn of 1991. When Croatia unilaterally declared its independence on the 
same day as Slovenia, Serb militia, backed by the Yugoslav National Army, 
started to take control of the Serb-populated areas in Krajina, eastern Slavonia 
and central Croatia. The war raged for four months before the parties agreed 
to a cease-fire, brokered by negotiators from what by then had become the 
European Union. 
The third Yugoslav war of secession escalated in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
during the spring of 1992. By then Bosnia's three ethnic groups (Muslims, 
Croats and Serbs) were irreconcilable. In October 1991, the Bosnian 
parliament voted for independence, resulting in the Bosnian Serbs walking out, 
and later forming a separate Serb parliament in Pale. In January 1992 the Pale 
parliament unilaterally declared the sovereignty of the Serb Republic ofBosnia-
Herzegovina. Tensions grew during the following months, and after an attack 
on the border town Zvornik, which involved Serb paramilitaries and the 
Yugoslav National Army, the Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegnvic, issued a 
general mobilisation of the Bosnian territorial defence.43 One month later, 
Bosnia descended into full war, and the systematic ethnic cleansing of the 
Serb-dominated areas in the north began. 
The initial International response 
In the first two months of 1992, Western states were preoccupied with two 
separate strategies: the EC initiated negotiations in Lisbon between the three 
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parties in the Bosnian conflict, based on the Swiss model with ethnic cantons. 
At the same time the United States launched a campaign for the international 
recognition ofBosnia-Herzegovina, which had been the odd man out following 
Europe's recognition of Slovenia and Croatia. The two separate strategies may 
have led Izetbegovic to withdraw his support for the Lisbon plan, in the hope 
that international recognition ofBosnia would result in international 
intervention.44 
As negotiations collapsed and the war in Bosnia escalated, the debate on 
Western intervention coincided with the debate on the future role ofNATO, 
including the division of responsibility between Europe and the United States, 
regarding European security. Not surprisingly, the most eager calls for an 
international military intervention authorised by the UN cani.e from countries 
which were not in a position to participate in any such action, most notably 
Germany (due to constitutional and historical constraints) and the Netherlands 
(which lacked the necessary combat forces). Washington, on the other band, 
was reluctant to take part in or even finance a UN force. The US Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, set out a number of principles 
for military intervention based on the Gulf War experience, and advised 
against the use of force. Britain was also reluctant to participate, and feared an 
endless military commitment. As a consequence the piecemeal approach, 
which had characterised the response of the West to the conflicts in Slovenia 
and Croatia, continued. When the United States was finally pushed into action 
following a visit by the Bosnian Foreign Minister to Washington, the course of 
action chosen was to establish a humanitarian airlift to Sarajevo." For lack of 
a political solution, the West focused on mitigating some of the most visible 
consequences of the war. 
Dissent on how to prevent war 
The debate on international recognition of the former Yugoslav republics 
revealed many problems in connection with the formulation of a common 
NATO policy regarding 'out-of-area' conflicts. At the time, Germany was the 
only NATO member which felt that its vital national interests were threatened 
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by the war, and the rest of the allies were reluctant to get involved. Moreover, 
it soon became clear that there was a significant difference between stating a 
preferred outcome, and providing the means to achieve it, as none of the allies 
were willing to deploy preventive forces in Bosnia. Transatlantic co-operation 
was further complicated by tensions between a divided Europe seeking greater 
influence and the United States, which was as reluctant to bear the financial 
burden of Europe's security as it was to relinquish its control over it. 
Until mid-1991, Western states took little action in response to the many 
signs ofYugoslavia's disintegration. There was general support for a united 
Yugoslavia, whereas economic assistance and political support for 
democratisation favoured the seceding republics.46 Western unity faltered 
when German policy began to change in favour of recognition during the 
summer of 1991. Germany's traditional multilateralism gave way to an 
unprecedented Aleingang regarding the question of recognition. The change in 
German policy was due to a combination of pressure from domestic groups 
siding with the Slovenes and the Croats (including the Catholic Church and 
the Croatian gastarbeiter community), the effect of thousands of refugees 
flowing into the country during 1991, and a genuine desire to put an 
immediate end to the violence erupting not far from the German border.41 
International recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was aimed at deterring the 
use of the Yugoslav National Army to keep Yugoslavia united, as this would 
then become a violation of two sovereign states. 
Apart from Austria, none of the Western powers initially supported 
Germany's policy. In fact, the EC-appointed mediator, Lord Carrington, the 
UN Secretary General and his envoy, Cyrus Vance, the US State Department 
and the international diplomatic corps in Belgrade, including Germany's own 
ambassador, warned of the potentially disastrous consequences (primarily for 
Bosnia) of premature recognition. 48 Despite this warning, Germany officially 
recognised Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991 and the European 
countries followed suit in January 1992. An important factor behind the 
change of policy by the European countries was the completion of 
negotiations regarding the Maastricht Treaty in December 1991, in which the 
Yugoslav crisis came to be seen as a test case for the ability of the European 
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Union to develop a common foreign and security policy. 
The United States continued to withhold recognition for a while, but its 
policy was far from clear and consistent. The Bush administration favoured a 
united Yugoslavia, but made it clear that the United States would not accept the 
use of force to achieve this. On the other hand, it was made equally clear that 
the United States would not engage its own forces to prevent this from 
happening. US policy was further confused by repeated resolutions from 
Congress calling for increased independence for the Albanian minority in 
Kosovo.49 The White House was also anxious to demonstrate to domestic 
audiences that the United States would not continue to shoulder the bulk of 
Europe's post-Cold War security expenses. 50 There was an undercurrent in 
Washington, 'often felt but seldom spoken', that it was time for the 
Europeans to show that they could act as a unified power, following years of 
transatlantic tension regarding the US role in Europe. 51 Consequently, 
international mediators lost their most valuable 'bargaining chip' - a unified 
international stance, linking recognition to an overall solution, including a 
solution to issues such as contested borders and minority rights. 
A military option? 
The question of extemal military intervention in Yugoslavia was the only point 
on which the major NATO powers agreed. None of the allies was willing to 
use force to back up their policy. 52 In the autumn of 1991 NATO's 'out-of-
area' capacity was in some ways rather limited. The new Rapid Reaction 
Corps was still in the planning stage. Few senior NATO officers or planners 
had any experience in peacekeeping or understanding of the inherent 
limitations of the use of force in peacekeeping operations. The extent to which 
diplomatic, civilian, humanitarian and military aspects were interrelated in such 
operations was also something new to NATO's military staff." More 
importantly, there was no political consensus on an independent role for 
NATO in operations outside Article 5. According to the US ambassador in 
Belgrade, Warren Zirnmerman, no Western government called for a military 
intervention by NATO in the Serbs-Croat war at the time: 'The use of force 
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was simply too big a step to consider in late 1991 ' 54 However, the outbreak of 
war in Bosnia a few months later made it impossible not to consider this 
option. 
The question of NATO involvement 
The first half of 1992 was also a turbulent time for NATO. Uncertainty 
regarding the future of the Alliance reached a new high, and competition 
between the 'Atlanticists', led by the United States, and the 'Europeanists', led 
by France, was intense. In the midst of this competition, the North Atlantic 
Council decision on 4 June 1992 became the decisive step towards a new role 
for NATO outside the treaty area. The Council decided to 'support, on a case 
by case basis in accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping activities 
under the responsibility of the CSCE, including making available Alliance 
resources and expertise'." What had changed in the last six months since the 
adoption of the new Strategic Concept? 
First, the Soviet Union had become the Commonwealth of Independent 
States, with a drastically reduced conventional military capacity. The threat of 
a major attack on NATO territory by conventional forces did not exist in the 
foreseeable future. 56 Questions such as 'Why do we need American troops in 
Europe if they are not going to be used for real security problems?' 57 began to 
appear frequently in American newspaper columns. The US Congress soon 
raised similar questions as well. 
Secondly, the members of the Western European Union had decided to 
increase the operational capacity of the organisation. In late May 1992, the 
French and German heads of states, Francois Mitterand and Helmut Kohl, 
launched a proposal for a 35,000-strongjoiot army corps, intended to be the 
nucleus of a future European army. On the day that the Eurocorps was 
announced, the US State Secretary, James Baker, called for political, 
diplomatic and economic action against Serbia, after having conferred with 
the British Prime Minister, John Major. 58 Even though Baker did not call for 
military intervention, he argued that NATO was the only organisation able to 
field forces of the kind needed to impose a cease-fire in Yugoslavia. 59 
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The UN's limited capacity was a third factor which opened up for NATO 
involvement. Many newspapers argued that peace had to be enforced, not 
brokered, in Yugoslavia and that NATO had to assume this role.''' The UN 
Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Gahli, fuelled the NATO-WEU 
competition by suggesting that he might ask the WEU to undertake 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. 6' 
What finally prompted NATO to act was probably the discussion prior to 
the CSCE meeting in Helsinki in July. By early summer it became clear that the 
CSCE was about to expand its responsibilities to include peacekeeping on the 
European continent, but there was no agreement as to how this should be 
done. France predictably objected to any expansion ofNATO's role, and 
argued that the CSCE should direct future requests for military assistance to 
individual states, not to regional organisations. Nevertheless, France caved in 
to pressure and the NAC made a formal decision to support the CSCE on a 
case-by-case basis. Following NATO's decision, the WEU soon followed suit, 
and on 19 June, issued the Petersberg Declaration, stating its willingness to 
'support, on a case by case basis and in accordance with our own 
procedures, the effective implementation of conflict-management measures, 
including peacekeeping activities of the CSCE or the United Nations Security 
Council. '62 
Thus, within the same month, both the Atlantic and European defence 
organisations had opened up for involvement in peacekeeping operations, 
outside their 'normal' area of operation. Edward Mortimer of the Financial 
Times perceptively questioned whether 'the argnment is not really about what 
should be done in the former Yugnslavia but about future security 
arrangements in Europe. ' 63 
However, the implications of these decisions were far from obvious. The 
geographical areas mentioned in the discussions at the NAC meeting were the 
former Yugoslavia and Nagomo Karabakh. However, the US Defence 
Secretary, Dick Cheney, made it clear that NATO 'won't necessarily take the 
next step in thinking Yugoslavia is the first place to implement such a 
decision',64 and the United States and Britain both stressed that there were no 
plans to send a NATO peacekeeping force to Croatia or Bosnia.65 None of the 
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Alliance members appeared to envisage the establishment of a permanent 
standby peacekeeping force. The fact that the NATO communique only 
referred to operations mandated by the CSCE, and not the UN, also indicated 
a lack of clarity for the implications. The main argument for allowing NATO 
assistance in such operations was its military strength, NATO being the only 
organisation able to enforce peace. But the CSCE clearly drew the line at 
peacekeeping, leaving enforcement actions to the UN Security Council. 66 In 
the end, it was the UN Security Council, that issued a mandate for NATO's 
first operation launched less than two months later. As noted by Rosalyn 
Higgins, 'without treaty amendments to allow it either to act in circumstances 
other than an attack on one of its members, or out of area, NATO had 
determined to do both of those things.'67 
Operation Maritime Monitor 
In response to a formal request from the UN Secretary General to NATO 
and the CSCE, both NATO and the WEU authorised parallel naval 
operations to monitor international compliance with UN sanctions against 
former Yugoslavia. 68 Thus NATO's involvement in the Yugoslav crisis 
began when the NATO Standing Naval Force Mediterranean entered the 
Adriatic Sea on 16 July 1992.69 At the time, NATO had never carried out 
an exercise for peacekeeping purposes and had no contingency plans for 
peacekeeping operations. 70 Once more, the decision to launch the 
operation seemed to be only partly related to events in Bosnia. A naval 
surveillance operation could only be expected to have a marginal influence 
on a war that was being fought on the ground. NATO's members had 
ruled out the use of force, but also stated their willingness to use NATO in 
support of 'peacekeeping activities'. The combination of a reluctance to use 
force and a need to demonstrate NATO's capability to act, led to the decision 
to launch a naval operation. This became NATO's first reluctant step into an 
'out-of-area' role. 
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1992-1995: UN assistant 
Introduction 
Over the next three to four years, NATO's involvement in Bosnia increased 
gradually. Throughout this period, NATO's role was restricted to the provision 
of military support to the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR), 
which was operating on the ground. Even though NATO's role remained one 
of support to another organisation, NATO's involvement expanded both 
quantitatively and qualitatively. The quantitative expansion occurred as new 
tasks were added to those already performed by NATO. The qualitative 
.expansion took place through an increase in the use offorce, a growing 
willingness to intervene directly in the war, and a gradual increase in NATO's 
control ofthe entire international operation. In December 1995, the 
transformation culminated with the formal transition of power from 
UNPROFOR to the NATO-led Implementation Force (!FOR). 
During this period, NATO had to confront three major challenges. The 
frrst was how to apply force in a peacekeeping operation. The second was 
how the UN and NATO, with their fundamentally different purposes, 
structures and traditions, could effectively work together towards the same 
goal. And the third was how to identify common interests and common policy 
within the Alliance with regard to an 'out-of-area' conflict NATO's struggle to 
tackle these challenges will be analysed in four main parts. 
First, a brief presentation of all NATO activities relating to the conflict in 
the former Yugoslavia during the UNPROFOR period will be provided in order 
to show the gradual, and almost accidental, expansion ofNATO's 
engagement. Secondly, political developments which provided the basis for 
NATO's operations will be discussed briefly. Thirdly, NATO's attempt to apply 
force in pursuit of ambiguous and unclear political goals will be analysed. The 
final part will examine how NATO's members tried to establish a new basis 
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for NATO's engagement in the first 'out-of-area' ground operation in its 
history. 
NATO's support of UNPROFOR - a brief description 
The first expansion ofNATO's tasks in Bosnia took place in October 1992, 
when NATO's naval monitoring operation was mirrored by Operation Sky 
Monitor. NATO's Early Warning and Control System (AWACS) force began to 
monitor the UN 'ban on military flights in the airspace ofBosnia-
Hetzegovina'. 71 The operation was an extension of the role ofNATO AWACS 
aircraft already involved in the monitoring operation in the Adriatic. The 
information gathered was to be passed on to UNPROFOR as part of its overall 
monitoring operation on the ground. 
The first qualitative expansion took place when Operation Maritime 
Monitor was changed to Operation Sharp Guard in November 1992. With 
reference to Chapter VII and Vlll of the UN Charter, the Security Council 
called upon 'States, acting nationally or through regional agencies or 
arrangements, to use such measures commensurate with the specific 
circumstances as may be necessary under the authority of the Security 
Council to halt all inward and outward maritime shipping in order to inspect 
and verify their cargoes and destinations and to ensure strict implementation 
of the provisions of Resolutions 713 (1991) and 757 (1992)'.72 The resolution 
allowed for the use of coercive force in the ongoing naval operations in the 
Adriatic. 
The second qualitative expansion took place when the air operation was 
also authorised to use furce. On 31 March 1993, the UN Security Council 
(again acting under Chapter VII of the Charter) authorised member states 
'acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, to take, 
under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close co-ordination 
with the Secretary General and UNPROFOR, all necessary means in the 
airspace of the Republic ofBosnia and Hetzegovina, in the event of further 
violation to ensure compliance with the bans on flights .. .'. n The North 
Atlantic Council approved plans for Operation Deny Flight on 8 April. The 
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operation began four days later. 
A few montbs later, another step was made when NATO was authorised 
to use 'protective air power in case of attack against UNPROFOR in the 
performance of its overall mandate, if it so requests'.74 The close air support 
operation began on 22 July 1993. Then, on 2 August 1993, in response to 
Serb advances outside Sarajevo, the North Atlantic Council expanded its own 
mandate, without UN authorisation. After a lengthy debate, the Council 
decided to make an 'extensive interpretation' ofUN Security Council 
Resolution 836, which authorised close air support in defence of 
UNPROFOR, by stating: 
The Alliance has now decided to make immediate preparations for 
undertaking, in the event that the strangulation of Sarajevo and other 
areas continues, including wide-scale interference with humanitarian 
assistance, stronger measures including air strikes against those 
responsible, Bosnia Serbs and others, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
In other words, NATO would not only provide protection for UNPROFOR, it 
would also conduct retaliation air strikes against one of the conflicting parties. 
Even though it was stressed that possible strikes should not be interpreted as a 
military intervention in the conflict, 75 NATO was, in practice, becoming 
directly involved in the war. However, the UN remained largely in control of 
NATO operations through the command arrangement, as NATO's use of air 
power had to be authorised by the UN Secretary General. 
These arrangements were the basis for NATO involvement over the next 
two years. A further step was taken in July 1995, when the UN control of air 
power was abandoned by an amendment of the command structure. The 
authority to approve air strikes was delegated from the UN Secretary General 
(or his special representative) to the commander ofUNPROFOR. The chain 
of command now only consisted of military personnel from NATO countries. 
Finally, in August 1995, NATO decided to intervene directly and decisively 
in the war. After a mortar attack on Sarajevo, the Commander in Chief of 
AFSOUTH and the Force Commander ofUNPROFOR authorised air strikes 
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against Bosnian Serb military targets, pursuant to UN Security Council 
Resolution 836.76 Operation Deliberate Force began on 30 August 1995. Over 
the next two weeks 3,515 sorties were carried out. On 14 September, the 
Serbs requested negotiations and agreed to the UN/NATO demands. By the 
end of the year the DaytonAgreernent had been signed and NATO's first 
peacekeeping ground force (!FOR) had formally taken responsibility for the 
international operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
This brief description ofNATO's gradually increasing involvement outside 
the NATO area shows that the escalation of NATO involvement was driven by 
day-to-day developments in the theatre, up to the point where NATO was so 
deeply involved that the credibility of the Alliance became intrinsically linked to 
its ability to manage the conflict. At the end of the UNPROFOR period, NATO 
had learned some expensive lessons. First, the difficulties connected with use 
of force in a peacekeeping operation had been painfully demonstrated. 
Secondly, c<K!peration with the UN had demonstrated the difficulties of 
uni:f)'i:ng NATO's need for swift and decisive action with the UN's need for 
broad consensus on a much wider range of interests. The most important 
lesson, though, was that an operation with no clear common NATO interest, 
resulted in the pursuit of differing national interests and a predominance of 
domestic agendas, which caused serious strains on the internal cohesion of 
the Alliance. 
The political setting 
Search for a political solution 
Between 1993 and 1995, there was no consensus among the major NATO 
powers with regard to a political solution to the war in Bosnia. On the 
contrary, there was disagreement over (1) which strategy to pursue to end the 
war, (2) which measures to apply to mitigate and contain the conflict and (3) 
in connection with this, the application of force by NATO. 
No less than four different peace plans were launched in 1993. The first 
plan, named after its creators, EU representative, Lord David Owen, and UN 
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envoy, Cyrus Vance, divided Bosnia into ethnically homogenous provinces 
within one state. The plan was rejected by tbe Bosnian Serbs, and tbe next bid 
for peace was tbe Stoltenberg-Owen Plan, which was negotiated in July and 
August 1993. As this plan gave tbe Muslims a smaller share oftbe territory 
tban tbe Vance-Owen Plan, no Western government was willing to put 
pressure on President Alija Izetbegovic, and tbe Bosnian parliament rejected 
tbe plan. The third attempt to reach a settlement was made on tbe British 
aircraft carrier, HMS Invincible, in September, but there was still no will to put 
pressure on tbe Bosnian Muslims, who again rejected tbe plan. In November, 
tbe European Union proposed a fourth plan which entailed tbe lifting of tbe 
economic sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro in return for a transfer of 
territory held by tbe Serbs to tbe Bosnians. However, tbe Americans refused 
to lift tbe sanctions, whereas Russia insisted tbat sanctions should be lifted 
right away, and tbe plan collapsed at a meeting in Brussels in December. 77 
All tbe plans failed to get tbe backing from all tbe external powers witb an 
interest in tbe outcome, and NATO's members also failed to give united 
support to any of tbe plans. The United States, which had tbe greatest 
influence over tbe Bosnian Muslims, found it particularly difficult to commit to 
any oftbe suggested political solutions. The incoming Clinton administration 
appeared to be botb ambivalent and divided about tbe war in Bosnia. In 
February tbe United States expressed reservations regarding tbe Vance-Owen 
Plan on tbe grounds tbat it rewarded Serb aggression. UN ambassador, 
Madeline Albright, argued tbat tbe plan amounted to 'rewarding aggression 
and punishing tbe victims', and advocated a more forceful approach involving 
air strikes. However, botb Congress and tbe military establislnnent were wary 
ofbeing dragged into tbe conflict. The US Chainnan oftbe Joint Chiefs of 
Staff, General Colin L. Powell, repeatedly argued tbat air strikes alone were 
not likely to deter Serb aggression78 and Congress expressed anguish 
regarding tbe possibility of US troops on tbe ground in Bosnia, as implicitly 
entailed by tbe Vance-Owen plan. By April, US State Secretary Warren 
Christopher's characterisation oftbe war in Bosnia had changed from 'a test 
case for America's ability to nurture democracy in tbe post-Cold War world' 
to 'an intractable 'problem from hell' tbat no one can be expected to solve'." 
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The first significant progress in tbe peace negotiations was made when tbe 
Americans decided to get directly involved in late 1993. In January 1994 tbe 
United States announced tbat tbe Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats, who 
had been engaged in heavy fighting since tbe previous summer, had agreed to 
a new Muslim/Croat Federation.80 The idea oftbe Federation came about 
largely due to growing US desperation. Documentation of Croat atrocities 
against Muslims in central Bosnia threatened to provoke international sanctions 
against Croatia. The United States was concerned about tbe humanitarian 
consequences of such sanctions for tbe many refugees in Croatia and Bosnia. 
Furtbennore, tbe shipment of arms to tbe Muslim forces through Croatia, 
which was secretly supported by tbe Americans, would become impossible. 
The United States, therefore, pressured tbe Croats to agree to tbe 
establishment oftbe Federation. However, tbe US engagement in tbe peace 
negotiations was only oflimited duration. 
In early 1994, growing frustration over tbe lack of political support from 
tbe great powers during tbe negotiation process led to tbe establislnnent of tbe 
Contact Group, consisting oftbe United States, Russia, Britain, France and 
Gennany. The group presented a new 'take-it-or-leave-it' peace plan to tbe 
parties in June 1994. When tbe Bosnian Serbs rejected tbe plan for tbe !bird 
time in August, tbe Group was unable to agree on tbe next move. The United 
States and Gennany insisted on isolating tbe Serbs, hoping tbat tbey would 
give in to pressure. The remaining members of tbe group feared tbat isolating 
tbe Serbs would only push tbem to adopt an even more radical policy. Unable 
to agree on this, tbe peace negotiations reached a stalemate, which lasted for 
more tban a year. The warring parties did not meet to negotiate between 
August 1994 and tbe preparation oftbe Dayton negotiations in October 1995. 
During this search for a political solution, consultations across tbe Atlantic 
were far from optimal. Gennany was tbe only European ally directly involved 
in tbe negotiation oftbe Federation, a fact tbat created some unhappiness 
among Europeans as tbey were effectively 'cut out ofBosnia diplomacy'." It 
was alarming tbat tbe lines of division cut right through NATO, witb some 
allies siding witb Russia and others witb tbe United States. Unable to agree on 
one peace plan, tbe countries involved focused on measures to mitigate and 
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contain the conflict. However, even then, the United States and various 
European countries favoured not only differing, but to a great extent, 
contradictory strategies. 
NATO's role in measures to relieve human suffering 
As the numerous attempts to negotiate peace in 1993 were unsuccessful, the 
humanitarian situation io Bosnia deteriorated rapidly. This led to public outrage 
io many countries and harsh criticism from the US Congress. In April 1993, 
the Senate opposition leader, Robert Dole, described the US policy io Bosnia 
as a disaster and advocated a 'lift and strike' policy, which involved the 
removal of the arms embargo against the Bosnian government and air strikes 
against Serb military targets. The Democrat chairman of the Senate Sub-
Committee on European Affairs supported the call for air strikes against Serb 
artillery, 82 whereas the US military leadership remained largely opposed. 
Nevertheless, pressure on the admioistration to adopt a more forceful policy 
towards the Serbs led to an American push for the stronger enforcement of 
sanctions. NATO first felt the consequences of this when the organisation 
was asked to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. On 31 March, 
the UN Security Council authorised member states 
acting nationally or through regional organisations or arrangements, to 
take, under the authority of the Security Council and subject to close 
co-ordination with the secretary-general and UNPROFOR, all 
necessary means in the airspace of the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, in the event of forther violation to ensure compliance 
with the bans on flights. 83 
In a letter dated 8 Aprill993, NATO's Secretary General, Manfred Wllmer, 
informed the UN Secretary General that NATO had taken the necessary measures 
to ensure compliance with the ban, and the operation began on 12 April 1993. 
However, the ban on flights did not stop the fighting on the ground. 
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Another, and far more controversial measure to mitigate the humanitarian 
consequences of the war was the establishment of 'safe areas', which were 
to cause tremendous problems for both the UN and NATO throughout the 
UNPROFOR period. Safe areas were created as a result of a series of events 
and several unfortunate compromises between conflicting interests within the 
UN Security Council. 84 The safe area concept had initially been launched in 
1992, but failed to gain the support of the five permanent members of the 
Security Council. At that time, the international negotiators, Owen and Vance, 
argued that safe areas would facilitate, rather than hamper, ethnic cleansing. 
However, as the humanitarian situation in the isolated Muslim enclaves 
deteriorated during the spring of 1993, the Security Council was confronted 
with a stark choice: either evacuate the enclaves, and thus stand accused of 
facilitating ethnic cleansing, or attempt to improve conditions for the people 
living there. To complicate matters, the Bosnian government was opposed to 
evacuation, which would entail surrendering territory to the Serbs. In addition, 
the removal of refugees from the enclaves would weaken pressure for an 
international humanitarian intervention. 
Pressure mounted in favour of more assertive international action for 
reasons largely unconnected to developments in the refugee enclaves. The US 
administration's reservations regarding the Vance-Owen plan led to a search 
for alternative strategies that would demonstrate action without conunitting to 
the deployment of US forces. Transatlantic bickering over the Vance-Owen 
Plan and the pressure from Congress for a 'lift and strike' policy also made it 
necessary to find an alternative which could re-establish NATO unity. 
On 14 April 1993, a Serb offensive threatened to overrun the Muslim 
enclave in Srebrenica. Two days later the UN Security Council demanded that 
'all parties and others concerned treat Srebrenica and its surroundings as a 
safe area which should be free from any armed attack or any other hostile 
act'." On 6 May, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Zepa, Gorazde and Bihac were given the 
same status by the UN Security Council. 86 
NATO became involved one month later when the Security Council 
extended UNPROFOR's mandate to 
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deter attacks against the safe areas, to monitor the cease-fire, to 
promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than 
those of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina 
and to occupy some key points on the ground, in addition to 
participating in the delivery of humanitarian relief to the population. 87 
In order to cany out its new mandate, UNPROFOR was authorised 
acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including the use 
of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the 
parties or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate 
obstruction in or around those areas to the freedom of movement of 
UNPROFOR or of protected humanitarian convoys." 
In order to enable UNPROFOR to perform these new tasks, the UN Security 
Council also authorised that 
Member States, acting nationally or through regional organisations or 
arrangements, may take, ... all necessary measures, through the use of 
air power, in and around the safe areas in the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, to support UNPROFOR in the performance of its 
mandate.89 
This highly unclear mandate meant that NATO's role was limited to the 
support ofUNPROFOR. UNPROFOR's mandate was inherently 
contradictory in that UNPROFOR was to deter attacks against the safe areas -
not protect or defend them, which would have required troops that no-one 
was willing to offer - but force should only be used when acting in self-
defence. The failure to define the safe areas geographically also meant that 
they were basically indefensible from a military point of view. Furthermore, to 
'promote the withdrawal of military or paramilitary units other than those of 
the Government of the Republic ofBosnia and Herzegovina' meant that only 
the Bosnian Setbs were to withdraw, and that withdrawal would have to be 
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based on consent. The non-aligned countries wanted to extend UNPROFOR's 
mandate to the defence of the safe areas, and would only support the 
resolution if the Bosnian forces were allowed to remain within the safe areas. 
Consequently, in order to secure the support of the non-aligned countries, the 
Bosnian government forces were not obliged to withdraw from the safe areas. 
However, by allowing the government forces to remain, the safe areas would 
not be demilitarised, and UNPROFOR would end up defending one army 
against the other. Consequently, the UN in practice departed from the principle 
of impartiality. 
Probably realising the weakness of this strategy, all the major powers 
declined to contribute troops for deployment in the safe areas. The Security 
Council dismissed as excessive an assessment by the UN secretariat, which 
estimated that 34,000 troops would be needed for the implementation of the 
safe area resolution. As the UN secretariat was under considerable pressure to 
come up with a solution, a 'light option' of7,600 troops was submitted, and 
subsequently accepted by the Security Council."' The combination of an 
inherently contradictory and unclear mandate, which one of the parties did not 
view as impartial, and grossly insufficient resources for its implementation, 
would soon undermine the credibility of both NATO and the UN. 
'Towards the abyss'- use of force in a political vacuum 
As there was no agreement on a comprehensive political solution, NATO's 
military operations became largely detached from the political deliberations. 
NATO operations were in response to separate incidents on the ground, 
without an overall strategy, and were a compromise between numerous actors 
with differing interests and agendas. Two main lines of conflict soon became 
apparent; first between NATO and the UN, and second between the United 
States and the NATO countries with troops on the ground in Bosnia (in 
l!JNPROFOR). The struggle between the UN and NATO was over the control 
of' the NATO operation, whereas the straggle between the United States and 
its European allies was about the choice of policy. Both struggles came to a 
head over the question of the use of air strikes against the Bosnian Setbs. 
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At the North Atlantic Council meeting on 10 June 1993, NATO gave its 
support to the establishment of safe areas and offered protective air power in 
case of attack against UNPROFOR, 'if it so requests' .91 This seemingly 
unproblematic fonnulation became known as the 'dual key' arrangement, 
requiring the approval of both the UN and NATO in order to launch NATO air 
strikes. However, this command and control procedure would soon create 
problems for NATO's reputation as an effective military organisation. An 
important step was taken on 2 August when NATO decided 'to make 
innnediate preparations for undertaking, in the event that the strangulation of 
Sarajevo and other areas continues, including wide-scale interference with 
humanitarian assistance, stronger measures including air strikes against those 
responsible, Bosnian Serbs and others, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. '92 The decision 
implied an extended interpretation of the UN resolutions, as the UN had only 
authorised use of force in self-defence, not punitive air strikes against one of 
the parties. NATO's independent decision was modified by stating that the 
new measures were to be conducted in full co-ordination with the UN, 'within 
the framework of relevant UN Security Council resolutions'." The decision 
was made under considerable pressure from the Americans, who had drafted 
the initiative." The Europeans, on the other hand, were concerned that 
punitive air strikes would entail the loss ofUNPROFOR's impartiality, but 
gave in to pressure. However, the discussion regarding the criteria for actual 
use of air power was far from finished. One week later the North Atlantic 
Council approved the 'Operational Options for Air Strikes in Bosnia-
Herzegovina', and specifically stated that the first use of air power in the 
theatre should be authorised by the UN Secretary General." Even though the 
Europeans had accepted in principle an extended use of air power, they had 
been able to secure continued UN control over the new instrument. As a 
compromise between the US demand for a tougher stance against the Bosnian 
Serbs and UNPROFOR's need for consent from all parties, it was stated that 
the decision should 'not be interpreted as a decision to intervene militarily in 
the conflict'. 96 
In a letter to the UN Secretary General in late July 1993, the US Secretary 
of State, Warren Christopher, made it clear that the United States would ask its 
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NATO allies to consider the use of air power 'against Bosnian Serb targets at 
times and places of NATO s own choosing ... consistent with authority already 
provided by Resolution 770 and 836' .97 At the NATO meeting on 4 August, 
where the request was discussed, the Americans insisted that the UN should 
only retain direct control in cases where 'aircraft were called upon to protect 
UNPROFOR but not with regard to other uses against Bosnian Serb targets. '98 
The European allies and Canada opposed the US proposal, which they felt 
threatened to turn 'the whole UN operation from neutral peacekeeping to 
peace-enforcement'," something which UNPROFOR was neither equipped 
nor dimensioned to do. The US finally had to accept that 'the choice of 
targets for air strikes must be approved by both NATO and the UN, and 
ultimately, that the first such attack required approval by the UN Secretary 
General' .100 The US concession was immediately criticised by Bob Dole, the 
Senate Republican leader, who argued that 'the American people did not elect 
Boutros-Ghali to run U.S. foreign policy' .101 
INIATO's resolve Is put to the test 
Disagreement over the use of air power did not really surface until the 
following year. Throughout 1994, however, NATO was repeatedly 
challenged by the Bosnian Serbs, resulting in punitive air strikes on six 
different occasions, close air support to UNPROFOR on one occasion and 
use of force to enforce the no-fly zone on another occasion. The air strike 
operations brought tensions between NATO and the UN over command 
and control arrangements to a head, as NATO went one step further by 
dictating conditions to the warring parties, and intervening directly in the 
war on the ground. 
The first incident that provoked NATO into action was the mortar 
attack on Sarajevo market place, on 5 February 1994, which killed 68 
civilians. Having repeated the promise to 'carry out air strikes in order to 
prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo, the safe areas and other threatened 
areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina' less than a month earlier, NATO's 
credibility was on the line.102 In a letter dated 6 February 1994, Boutros-
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Gahli requested that the North Atlantic Council 
authorise the Commander-in-Chief of NATO~ Southern Command to 
launch air strikes, at the request of the United Nations, against artillery 
or mortar positions in and around Sarajevo which are determined by 
UNPROFOR to be the responsible for attacks against civilian targets in 
that city. 103 
NAlO's response on 9 February went one step further by demanding that all 
heavy weapons within a 20-kilometre exclusion zone should be withdrawn, 
and threatening to launch air strikes against any weapons remaining after the 
10-day deadline had expired. The air strikes were to be conducted in 'close 
co-ordination with the UN Secretary General' .104 
Following more than 12 hours of discussion at the North Atlantic Council 
meeting, the decision was clearly a compromise between different views. The 
ultimatum entailed a new qualitative expansion ofNAlO's role, as such an 
intervention was, by its very nature, bound to be seen 'as a decision to 
intervene militarily in the conflict'·105 which was exactly what NA10 had 
stated it would not do in August the previous year. The ultimatum was also a 
very broad interpretation of the UN Security Council resolutions, and 
provoked Russian reactions. Russia lirgued that the demand to hand over 
control of heavy weapons to UNPROFOR and withdrawal from a 20-
kilometre radius around Sarajevo, required a new mandate from the Security 
Council. NA10 countries, on the other hand, argued that this approach 
entailed a change of method not a change of policy.'"' But NA10 was also 
forcing itself into a corner by setting an ultimatum without having the 
authority to fully control its own response to any violations of the ultimatum. 
The UN was still responsible for deciding whether there had been a violation, 
and whether air strikes should therefore be launched. This resulted in what 
former Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping 
operations, Shashi Tharoor, called the problem of competing credibilities.107 
Whereas the credibility of the UN was based on established principles 
developed during the Cold War- the most important being impartiality, 
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consent and minimum use of force- NAlO's credibility was linked to military 
effectiveness. IfNAro failed to carry out its threat, one newspaper 
commented that NA10 would 'lose what little credibility it still has and might 
as well pack its bags and admit that it has no further role to play as an 
effective security 01ganisation in a post-Cold War Europe' .108 
In an attempt to clarity the command and control arrangements, Manfred 
Womer stated that air strikes taking place before the deadline would need the 
approval of the UN, but once the deadline had expired, attacks would take 
place simply 'in close co-ordination' with the UN.",. The Commander of the 
UN troops, General Sir Michael Rose, was of a different opinion, and 
contended that he had the authority to request the air strikes.110 However, the 
fight between the UN and NA10 was postponed. After some controversy 
over the interpretation of the term 'control by the UN', and the deployment of 
Russian peacekeeping troops in the exclusion zone, it was decided that the 
Serbs had complied with the ultimatum, and the air strikes were called off. Ill 
The limits of NATO's effectiveness are revealed 
While NAlO's deterrence strategy worked in Sarajevo, it was less successful 
in Gorazde only a few months later. First of all, the vulnerability ofNAlO's 
close air support to UNPROFOR was effectively revealed, when UNPROFOR 
troops in Gorazde requested close air support on I 0 and 11 April 1994. In 
response to this request, NA10 bombed a Serb artillery command bunker and 
a group of tanks and armoured personnel carriers outside the city.112 However, 
the NA10 air strikes were ineffective for three main reasons. First, strikes 
against mobile tactical targets proved to be extremely vulnerable to bad 
weather conditions. In order to locate the targets, NA10 planes had to 
descend below the clouds, and flying at such a low altitude left only seconds 
to identity targets as they overflew Gorazde. Secondly, flying this low also 
made the planes vulnerable to counter attacks by Serb forces on the ground, 
and one British Sea Harrier was in fact shot down. Finally, the vulnerability of 
the combination of air strikes and lightly armed peacekeepers on the ground 
was demonstrated when the Bosnian Serbs took !50 UN soldiers and aid 
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workers hostage and demanded that the air strikes be called off. 113 
The continued Serb offensive led to the second NATO ultimatum designed 
to protect the safe areas, issued on 22 April 1994.114 NATO's ultimatum to the 
Serbs surrounding Gorazde demanded that they immediately cease all attacks, 
pull back their forces to three kilometres from the city centre within two days, 
and provide free entry for UN forces, humanitarian relief convoys, and 
medical assistance teams. Failure to comply would be met with air strikes 
against Bosnian Serb heavy weapons and other military targets within a 20-
kilometre radius from the centre of Gorazde. NATO also introduced a military 
exclusion zone around Gorazde, from which all heavy weapons had to be 
withdrawn within five days. Whereas the Sarajevo ultimatum had demanded 
that all parties withdrew their weapons from the exclusion zone, this time the 
demand was directed at the Serbs alone. 
In the same ultimatum NATO also made an attempt to gain more control 
over its own ability to act It was specified that NATO military authorities 
'may recommend the initiation of additional air attacks, to be carried out in co-
ordination with UNPROFOR' ,115 which meant that NATO would no longer 
only act on the request of the UN. Moreover, 'once air attacks have been 
carried out against a specific target set pursuant to these decisions, the NATO 
Military Authorities may continue to carry out, in co-ordination with 
UNPROFOR, the attacks against that target set until NATO Military 
Authorities judge the mission to be accomplished' .116 In other words, when an 
attack had been initiated, NATO's military leadership could decide when to call 
it off without consulting its political leaders. Even though the phrase 'in co-
ordination with UNPROFOR' was still in place, the procedures attempted to 
effectively cut the UN out of the chain of command. 
However, once again the situation ended without any clarification of who 
was really in charge. It was agreed that the Bosnian Serbs had complied with 
the ultimatum, but the decision was contested, and Serb paramilitary 
personnel, claiming to be policemen, not soldiers, were still observed within 
the three-kilometre limit.117 Some observers concluded that NATO's ultimatum 
had been respected, and the threat of using air power had been sufficiently 
credible to preveut its use.118 Others claimed that the Serbs had achieved their 
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goal of effectively encircling the enclave and that 'air strikes ... had come and 
gone with no effect on the course of the war' .119 
UN-NATO struggle over command and control 
Several lessons were learned about to the relationship between the UN and 
NATO from the Sarajevo and Gorazde incidents in 1994. One lesson was that 
any attempt to make NATO 'the muscle' of a UN operation meant that the 
perception of each organisation would become largely indistinguishable from 
that of the other. The fact that NATO air strikes had been directed by forward 
controllers on the ground in UN uniforms, meant that the UN could not 
distance itself from the partiality entailed in air strikes conducted against one 
side only. NATO, on the other hand, had learned that its military strength was 
paralysed if the UN Special Representative, whose approval was required for 
launching air strikes, simply made himself unavailable on the phone. The two 
organisations, which depended on fundamentally different principles to retain 
their credibility, had become closely interlinked. Consequently, both 
organisations felt the need to retain control over the use of force. 
But the NATO-UN disagreement was only to some extent the result of 
competing credibility; it was also a result of an internal disagreement between 
allies. The air strikes and exclusion zones (which would have to be defended 
by air power) were American initiatives, puShed through against the will of 
important allies such as Britain and France.120 The air strike policy also caused 
controversy within the US administration. General John M. Shalikashvili, the 
new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated on 7 April that '[r]ight now, 
it is our judgement that conditions in Gorazde do not lend themselves to the 
use of air power' .121 He was supported by the Defence Secretary, William J. 
Perry, but rebuked by State Department officials who maintained that air 
strikes were needed as leverage against the Serbs.122 The reason for the 
restrictive attitude of the US military was that air strikes were unlikely to have 
any military impact on Serb forces outside Gorazde. The rationale behind the 
use of air power was always the political, and not the military effect it would 
have on the Serbs. Though it was hoped that air strikes would demonstrate 
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Western resolve, this resolve proved to be limited, and the Serbs were not 
deterred. When the bluff was called, the air strikes had the opposite effect of 
revealing internal differences which weakened the bargaining position of the 
Western powers. 
The relationship between NATO and the UN remained strained through the 
spring and summer of 1994, as did the relations between the Unite_d _state_s and 
its European allies. A new dimension was added when the US adrrumstration, 
under intense pressure from Congress, repeated the threat to lift the weapons 
embargo against the Bosnian government. In response, Europe threatened to 
pull out of UNPROFOR.123 In September 1994, the UN Secretary General 
noted: 
the use of 'disincentives ' such as the general imposition and stricter 
enforcement of the exclusion zones around the safe areas in order to 
influence the outcome of the conflict, or the lifting of the arms embargo 
in favour of the Government of B-H. would change the na~ of the 
United Nations presence in the area and imply unacceptable r1sks to 
UNPROFOR The former action would place UNPROFOR 
unambiguously on the one side of an ongoing conflict. The latter step 
would be tantamount to fanning the flames of that the United Nations 
is deployed to extinguish. In both cases the result would be a 
fundamental shift from the logic of peacekeeping to the logic of war 
and would require the withdrawal of UNPROFOR. 124 
In the same report Boutros-Ghali made it clear that he had instructed that 
plans for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR at short notice were to be finalised, 
and that this operation would require 'the temporary introduction of a 
significant number of highly combat-capable ground forces provided by 
Member States outside the United Nations framework. ' 125 
But NAlD was also becoming increasingly unhappy about the partnership. 
In September 1994, NATO was embarrassed following a UN-ordered pinprick 
air strike against an empty and immobilised Serb tank outside Sarajevo. 
Besides selecting an already immobilised target, UN commanders also gave the 
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Serbs warnings of the air strike. As a result, NAlD requested that its mandate 
be changed in order to allow for multiple targets and no advance warning.'" 
The UN Secretary General and Russia were reluctaot to give NAlD an 
increased military role, but fmally gave in by the end of October. Advance 
warning would no longer necessarily be given before an air strike, and NATO 
would be authorised to strike against three or four targets each time.127 NAlD 
had succeeded in extending its mandate once again, but political disagreement 
within the Alliance had deepened, rendering these changes temporarily 
irrelevant 
The end of transatlantic unity 
At the same time that transatlantic tensions peaked, the United States declared 
its intention to lift the arms embargo if the Serbs failed to endorse the Contact 
Group's peace plan launched on 15 October. Following a by then familiar 
pattern, the Europeans then threatened to withdraw from Bosnia. The 
American refusal to send troops to protect withdrawing allied troops, who 
were then likely to suffer severe losses, added new tensions.128 Then, on 11 
November 1994, the United States unilaterally announced that it would no 
longer participate in the enforcement of the arms embargo against former 
Yugoslavia and would cease to share intelligence concerning such shipments 
with the allies. The US order cut sharply across allied command arrangements 
and revealed an American disregard for the aims and constraints of its 
European allies.129 On the other hand, the Clinton administration was under 
intense pressure from Congress to lift the embargo altogether, and the 
decision to stop enforcing it did alleviate some of that tension. Nevertheless, 
the decision prompted The Economist to ask whether in five years NAlD 
governments would look back at the US decision, as their first formal parting 
of ways, and the beginning of a widening rift that would fatally weaken their 
alliance. 130 
The fact that the allies were informed about the decision through a leaked 
newspaper story before any official notification had been given, indicated that 
NAlD consultations over which policy to pursue in Bosnia had broken down. 
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The United States was also becoming more militarily involved in Croatia and 
the Bosnian Federation through agreements on military co-operation,131 which 
caused further criticism from its allies who favoured an even-handed 
approach. It was later revealed that the Americans had decided to turn a blind 
eye to Iranian arms shipments through Croatia earlier on in 1994.132 
With transatlantic relations below freezing point, Serb jet planes once again 
violated the no-fly zone and the safe area resolution by dropping napalm on the 
Bihac enclave, which was protected by 1,000 lightly armed soldiers from 
Bangladesh.133 The subsequent NAlO air strikes had limited elfuct, and only 
destroyed runways that were easy to repair. The Serbs responded by taking several 
hundred UN peacekeepers hostage.134 The incoming Republican llll!iori1y leader in 
Congress, Bob Dole, called for the withdrawal ofUN forces, and the lifling of the 
arms embargo. Dole argued that NAlO's military actions had so far been more or 
less inelevant to the conflict, and that the Alliance was heading for 'a complete 
breakdown' .135 Responding to the critics, the US Defence Secretary, William J. 
Perry, promised that the administration would consult carefully with Congress 
before committing any forces to a rescue operation in Bosnia, thus making it 
painfully clear that the United States would not automatically assist in the 
withdrawal ofUNPROFOR. 
The breakdown in consultation procedures was also evident in the Contact 
Group, which was managing the paralysed peace negotiations. At a meeting 
on 2 December, the Americans emphasised the need to continue to isolate the 
Bosnian Serbs and to maintain a united front within the Group. However, 
during the very same meeting the US representative received a message that 
Charles Redman, the US special envoy, was on his way to Pale to meet 
Radovan Karadzic, the Bosnian Serb leader.136 
The year ended with a number of questions hanging in the air. The 
Financial limes commented that while new models of 'burden-sharing' were 
being discussed, the general nature of the same burdens remained unclear, 137 
and NAlO had come to be viewed as a luxlll)' rather than a necessity by 
many on both sides of the Atlantic.'" Summing up the situation, one would 
have to conclude that NAlO had not been able to influence the war in Bosnia. 
The UN-NAlO struggle for control over the joint operations remained 
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unsettled. Transatlantic unity, 'the underlying political compact that binds 
North America's fate to Europe's democracies' as stated in NATO's first 
declaration in the post-Cold War era, 139 had almost collapsed. Over the next 
year, NATO's members managed at least to find temporary solutions to all 
these problems. However, it would get worse before it got better. 
NATO crosses the line - from peacekeeping to 
enforcement 
In 1995, NAlO formally decided to 'cross the Mogadishu line' 140 by moving 
from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. At the same time NATO abandoned 
the role as a UN support organisation, and took complete control of its own 
operation. Both changes took place without a formal extension of the mandate 
from the UN Security Council. These important NATO decisions were once 
more a reaction to more or less unpredictable events on the ground in Bosnia. 
The turning point was the fall ofSrebrenica in July 1995. After UNPROFOR 
was forced to abandon this so-called safe area to Bosnian Serb forces, the 
impossibility of upholding a peacekeeping operation in the midst of a war 
became clear to everyone. 
The build-up to the crisis 
The first months of 1995 were relatively calm as a cease-fire, brokered by 
former US president Jimmy Carter, lasted over the winter. However, both 
parties used the time to prepare for new rounds of hostilities and by the end of 
March fighting had resumed. A new confrontation between NAlO and 
Bosnian Serb forces came to a head in late May. Once more a mortar attack 
killed a large number of civilians in Sarajevo, and NAlO retaliated by striking 
at ammunition depots near Pale on 25-26 May, 141 a retaliatory attack with no 
influence on the situation in Sarajevo. The Serbs responded by intensified 
attacks on Tuzla, another safe area, and also took several hundred UN troops 
and observers hostage. In addition, the strangulation of all the safe areas, 
including Sarajevo, was tightened. The Serbs appeared unaffected by both the 
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air raids and the strong condemnations from the North Atlantic Council. 
Consequently, international media commented that once more the Serbs had 
called the bluff of the United Nations and NAT0.142 As the Bosnian Serbs 
continued to violate NATO-imposed ultimatums, and humanitarian conditions 
in the safe areas deteriorated even. further, NATO's credibility as an effective 
military organisation was suffering badly. 
lbroughout the spring of 1995 the situation became more and more 
untenable for all those involved. It became increasingly clear that the UN 
operation was failing to fulfil its humanitarian mission, and serious 
preparations began for withdrawal. However, the plans for withdrawal also 
created transatlantic tensions. US reluctance to commit ground troops in 
support of a withdrawal resulted in a new transatlantic row over the NATO 
plan for UNPROFOR assistance. The situation changed decisively in June 
when France, Britain and the Netherlands agreed to reinforce UNPROFOR 
with 10,000 troops in a separate Rapid Reaction Force.143 The new force 
would be subject to UN command, but would operate in national uniforms 
without blue UN helmets. 144 The contributing nations stated: 
The purpose of the RRF would be to" give the commander a capacity 
between 'strong protest and air strikes'; it would increrue tactical 
operational flexibility and would be intended to have a deterrent effect 
but it would not change the United Nations role to peace-enforcement; 
the status ofUNPROFOR and its impartiality would be unaffected 145 
The impartiality, which was the basis of the UNPROFOR operation, was thus 
maintained on paper, but from the perspective of the Serbs, the UN and NATO 
were siding with the Federation forces. At the same time The Economist 
pointed to another dilemma, when it asked whether turning a better-armoured 
cheek to Bosnian Serb provocations could camouflage the fact that it 
remained unclear what the new force was going to do. 146 However, the new 
force was the first indication of a change in Western policy. The deployment 
of the RRF-force caused concern in Washington, which feared that NATO 
and the United States would be sidelined in Bosnia. 
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A new transatlantic row broke out when an offer of US air and logistical 
support was made conditional on the US support not being subject to UN 
control.147 However, a few weeks later, the NAC endorsed Operation Plan 
40 I 04, which obliged the United States to assist in the eventual evacuation of 
UNPROFOR.148 The effects of Plan 40 I 04 were twofold. First, it introduced 
a deadline making it impossible to continue the indefinite efforts to keep the 
fighting just below boiling point The evacuation process was estimated to 
take six months, and would have to be completed before winter conditions 
made the use of air force difficult and roads impassable. Consequently, 
evacuation had to start soon, or wait until next spring. Furthermore, the 
evacuation plan raised the stakes of the external actors dramatically. The plan 
entailed the deployment of20,000 American troops, and the US administration 
was suddenly confronted with a worst-case scenario: US forces deployed on 
the ground in Bosnia in an operation which was likely to be met with open 
resistance by the warring parties as well as by the civilian population. In the 
case of a UN withdrawal Washington's options were thus drastically 
narrowed: either to assist the operation or withhold its support, which would 
undennine the US role in European security policy.1" According to Carl Bildt, 
who had replaced Lord Owen as the EU representative, confidence in NATO 
and its member governments would be severely damaged if the evacuation 
process led to horrifying pictures of Bosnian women and children trying to 
stop the NATO-assisted withdrawing forces. However, as the implementation 
of the plan implied political disaster, it also gave considerable political impetus 
to find a solution.150 According to Richard Holbrooke, the US negotiator in 
Dayton, the United States was forced to fmd a policy that prevented UN 
withdrawal, and thus to get more heavily involved.151 
The UN operation collapses- the fall of Srebrenlca 
Any hopes of a continuation of the hard-pressed UNPROFOR operation were 
finally shattered by the fall of Srebrenica on 11 July 1995. The same event 
effectively destroyed any illusions that may have remained as to what could be 
achieved by NATO air power, as were any illusions about the willingness of 
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UNPROFOR states to accept losses in defence ofBosnian civilians. The tragic 
events are well known. After days of intense shelling by the Serbs, the Dutch 
forces in Srebrenica requested NATO air strikes, which were finally approved 
by UNPROFOR after some bureaucratic entanglement. As soon as the air 
raids began the Serbs issued an ultimatum: 'if the attacks were not stopped 
forthwith they would kill the captured Dutch soldiers and shell the refugees 
and Dutchbat indiscriminately' .152 The Serb message was communicated to 
the UN Headquarters in Sarajevo and then directly to The Hague. The lightly 
armed and isolated Dutch troops were in no position to defend the enclave 
against the attacks, and the Dutch Defence Minister, Joris Voorhoeve, reacted 
immediately. Bypassing regular UN and NATO channels, he called NATO's Air 
Operation Co-ordination Centre in Vicenza directly and called off the air 
operation."' Consequently, the UN troops were forced to become passive 
bystanders as Serb forces entered the city and separated men and women. 
The fall of Srebrenica had several consequences. Horrifying reports of the 
massacre of several thousand men in Srebrenica led to a public outcry and 
calls for a more robust international intervention. The fact that the UN 
Security Council declared that Srebrenica should be restored as a safe area 154 
only served to highlight the gap between the words and deeds of the members 
of the UN Security Council. It was estimated that recapturing Srebrenica 
would require a force the size of a division. Given the situation it would be 
completely unrealistic to assemble such a force, and EU envoy Car! Bildt 
called the UN resolution 'absurd' .155 In the United States, Congress finally 
carried out its threat to pass a vote ending the US participation in the arms 
embargo against Bosnia Clinton vowed to veto the vote, but a two-third 
majority in each house of Congress could overturn the veto.156 If this were to 
happen, the flow of weapons to the area would force Europe to withdraw its 
troops. In that case, the United States would have to fulfil its obligations 
according to Operation Plan 40 I 04. In any event the transatlantic relationship 
would be severely damaged. 
As both Europe and the United States were in a desperate position, they 
were able to agree on a new policy. NATO decided to take tougher actions 
against Serb attacks on the safe areas and the 'dual key' arrangement was 
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therefore revised. The UN civilian authorities were cut from the chain of 
command, despite Russia's objections.'" The UN 'key' was delegated to the 
Force Commander of a strengthened UNPROFOR, the French General 
Bemard Janvier, who was authorised to delegate it further to the Commander 
ofUNPROFOR, 'when operational circumstances so require'.'" New rules of 
engagement were also agreed, allowing pre-emptive strikes on a wide range of 
targets in order to protect NATO planes from the Serb air defences.159 NATO 
was detennined to demonstrate its force - all it needed was new provocation 
from the Serbs. 
Peace enforcement 
The provocation came in late August when a new mortar hit the Sarajevo 
marketplace killing 37 people.160 In retaliation NATO planes attacked Bosnian 
Serb positions around Sarajevo on 30 August. The ensuing Operation 
Deliberate Force lasted several weeks. There seems to be general agreement 
that the operation had a psychological effect on both sides and made 
international threats of the use of force more credible. The major advantages 
of the Serbs forces, which were superior mobility and frrepower, also 
suffered, as NATO's bombs targeted the Serb lines of command and 
ammunition and fuel depots. However, the military effect of the air campaign 
was contested and it would be simplistic to argue that the air campaign ended 
the war. At the end of the campaign, NATO had almost exhausted its list of 
targets, which had been chosen carefully in order to minimise collateral 
damage and camage.161 The commander ofNATO's southern air forces, 
General Michael E. Ryan, recognised the limitations of the air operation, when 
he admitted that • ... ifNATO had committed an atrocity from the air, then we 
would be seen in the same light as those who were committing the atrocities 
in the ground. And that would have brought the operation to a dead halt. ' 162 
Taking this into account, it seems unlikely that air operations alone could have 
ended the war. In fact, NATO was about to exhaust its 'Option TWo' target 
list (ammunition dumps, communication equipment, arms factories and 
strategic bridges) when the Serbs complied with NATO's ultimatum and 
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agreed to a cease-fire."' IfNA10 had moved to 'Option Three', which included 
military bases, infrastructure and economic 1argets, the Serb casualties - both 
militaJy and civilian-would inevi1ably have risen."' 
However, the air campaign boosted the morale of the Croat and Bosnian furces, 
who launched a new successful offensive on the groWid.165 By then, the situation 
on the grotmd had changed completely. The safe areas ofSrebrenica and Zepa had 
already fiillen. The UN force had withdrawn from S~ntrolled areas and had 
heeo reinforced by the Rapid Reaction Force, making it less vulnerable to Serb 
re1aliation. Following the well-planned Croat offensive against the UN protected 
area ofl<njjina, which fell within days and created 200,000 Serbs refugees, the 
frontlines became clearer and intervention on behalf of one of the parties was thus 
made easier. The lack of reaction to the Krajina offensive by Belgrade and the 
·important Western powers also demoralised the Bosnian Serb forces. Economic 
sanctions against Serbia had already resulted in a split between Belgrade and Pale, 
which :futally weakened the Bosnian Serbs, who were now effectively without 
allies. Consequently, on 20 September 1995, CINCSOUTII and the UN Peace 
Force Commander concluded that the Serbs had complied with the conditions set 
out by the two organisations: no atlacks on Sarajevo and other safe areas, 
withdrawal from the Sarajevo exclusion zone and freedom of movement for the 
UN and NGOs and unrestricted use of the Sarajevo air port.166 The air campaign 
was therefore called off. 
Operation Deliberate Force was the last step in the infonnal extension of 
NA10's authority doring the UNPROFOR period. The mandate for NAlO's use of 
force was still vested in Secwity CoWicil Resolution 836, issued inAprill993. 
Bearing in mind that NA10 was only authorised to protect UNPROFOR and that 
UNPROFOR was only to use force in self defence, one must conclude that NA10 
had strayed considerably from the original mandate. 
Why did NATO air power fall to deter Serb aggression? 
NATO's use of air power during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina continues to 
be a matter of discussion. Some are of the view that it was ineffective due to 
the 'wetness' of the UN secretariat which was primarily concerned with the 
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safety of its own troops. The UN's dilemma is illustrated by the much quoted 
statement by Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary 
General, who denied NA10 air support on several occasions: 'the man you 
bomb today is the same man whose co-operation you may require tomorrow 
for the passage of a humanitarian convoy'. 167 Other people have blamed the 
complex and bureaucratic decision-making procedure vested in the 'dual key' 
arrangement. The procedure was clearly less than optimal, judging by military 
effectiveness standards. However, when the Dutch Defence Minister cut 
directly through both UN and NA10 command chains to stop NA10 attacks 
in order to save Dutch troops in Srebrenica, it demonstrated that the 
ineffectiveness ofNA10 air strikes could not have been solved by technical 
improvements. The problems were far more fimdamental. 
The original mission - close air support to protect UN forces Wider direct 
atlack- was hampered by operational and technical difficulties. Close air 
support was only to be applied when the UN troops were already Wider 
atlack. Due to cumbersome decision-making procedures and the fact that the 
air base was as far away as Italy, the Bosnian Serbs were able to call off the 
atmck before NA10 aircraft arrived. Attacks were also hampered by bad 
weather conditions and moWitainous, forest-covered terrain which favoured 
the groWid forces. Finally, as fighting took place in densely populated areas, 
the risk of air strikes causing collateral damage was considerable. 
By using pWiitive air strikes, which became a major part ofNAlO's air 
operation, NA10 avoided some of these difficulties (such as responding only 
to an on-going attack), but created new ones. First of all, as the air strikes 
were directed at only one party, NATO and the UN departed from an impartial 
role. As the safe areas were not demilitarised, they became strategically 
important in the ongoing war. The Bosnians used the safe areas for military 
installations, for troops to rest, train and equip themselves, and to fire at Serb 
positions. The safe areas thus permitted the Bosnian Government Army to 
laWich new offensives against Serbs. According to the UN, the Headquarter of 
the Fifth Corps of the Government Army was located in Bihac, and that of the 
Second Corps in the town of Tuzla. The General Command of the 
Government Army was situated in Sarajevo, and a substantial number of 
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troops remained in Srebrenica, Gorazde and Zepa.168 In such a situation, the 
UN Secretruy General concluded, 'the efforts of UNPROFOR to defend the 
safe areas make it necessary to obstruct only one of the hostile forces, which 
considers itself to be merely reacting to offensives launched by the other.'169 
Intervention in the war proved impossible to combine with UNPROFOR's 
humanitarian mission, the success of which depended on the consent of all 
the parties.170 In addition, lightly armed and thinly scattered peacekeepers on 
the ground were taken hostage in retaliation for the air strikes, which 
effectively paralysed NA10. 
Any overall conclusion from the UNPROFOR period must take into 
account that the UN peacekeeping operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was 
introduced even though there was no peace to keep. Continuous cease-fire 
violations, the absence of clear front lines and legitimate political 
authorities in the mission area all seriously challenged the UN's ability to 
carry out its mandate. The introduction of NATO as a 'muscle' behind the 
UN-led operation did not solve any of these problems and proved difficult 
for both organisations. As a result, NATO finally took control of the entire 
operation and adopted an independent enforcement role outside NATO 
territory. During the UNPROFOR period NATO's operations took place in 
a conceptual vacuum. Neither NATO as an organisation nor many of its 
members had a political-military doctrine for 'out-of-area' operations."' 
Consequently, problems connected to the application of force in situations 
other than war were seriously underestimated in this first attempt to 
convert a collective defence alliance into an instroment for crisis 
management and peacekeeping. 
Preparing for IFOR in Dayton 
Operation Deliberate Force ended the Serb siege of Sarajevo, but the 
fighting continued in Western Bosnia where Croat and Bosnian forces 
were conquering lost territory and creating new refugee flows (this time 
consisting ofBosnian Serbs). After a month of brutal fighting on the 
ground in order to gain the most favourable position prior to the up-
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coming peace talks, a cease-fire entered into force on 11 October and 
peace talks began at Dayton, Ohio, on I November 1995. 
NATO's role at Dayton 
NATO's role in the implementation of the peace plan was perhaps the least 
contentious issue during the peace negotiations in Dayton. According to the 
head of the British delegation at the peace talks, Pauline Neville-Jones, there 
was a 'high degree of underlying agreement' on this issue.172 The fact that the 
UN Secretary General had rejected the idea of an independent peacekeeping 
role for NA10 only one year earlier illustrates how radically the situation had 
changed. 
The idea of a NA10 implementation force had been on the table since the 
negotiation of the Vance-Owen plan in 1993. However, it was not seriously 
assessed before July 1994, when Boutros-Ghali considered three options for 
the implementation of a peace agreement in Bosnia-Herzegovina based on the 
assumption that such a force would require 60,000 troops and would operate 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.173 The three options were (I) a normal 
UN field operation; (2) a NA10 force responsible for military operations 
combined with a UN operation responsible for police and civilian functions; 
and (3) an ad hoc unified task force comprising resources from interested 
member states and regional organisations. 
The first option was ruled out for two reasons: a lack of the necessary 
personnel and funds, and insufficient capacity to command, control and 
manage such an operation. The Secretary General also decided against the 
second option, arguing that contingency planning had thrown light on a 
number of difficulties that militated strongly against this option, notably: 
the question of how some degree of United Nations political control 
could be exercised over the Force in the field and how adequate co-
ordination could be effected between the military elements which would 
be under NATO command and the police and civilian elements which 
would be under United Nations command. 174 
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Boutros-Ghali also pointed to Russia's reservation about NATO's role in the 
implementation of a negotiated settlement. He therefore recommended an ad 
hoc International Task Force, which would draw up its own financial, 
logistical and administrative arrangements. The task force would receive a 
mandate from the UN Security Council, which in turn would decide which 
arrangements were necessary to ensure that it received adequate information 
about the operation. Nevertheless, when the final peace talks began in Dayton, 
the only thing that was certain was that NATO would implement the 
comprehensive settlement Consequently, an arrangement similar to the 
second option was chosen. However, at least some of the difficulties 
predicted by the UN Secretary General proved valid. In a discussion paper 
presented to NATO in September 1996, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) concluded that the relationship between the UN 
and !FOR had been 'excellent in theory but poor in practice' and that, for 
instance, 'military information of political significance is not very well shared 
by !FOR thus affecting the effectiveness of the civilian implementation 
process'.'" On the otber hand, it seems unlikely that such problems could 
have been avoided by replacing the NATO force by an ad hoc force 
comprised of 'interested states'. 
The Dayton Agreement - return to transatlantic unity? 
To many, the Dayton Agreement was proof !bat the transatlantic tensions of 
the UNPROFOR period were a tbing of the past According to Pauline Neville-
Jones 'The greatest relief of all [at Dayton] was that the Alliance had a basis 
on which to pull together' .176 First of all, NATO members agreed !bat the 
credibility of the Alliance would have to be restored by an effective 
peacekeeping operation. Consequently, NATO's rules of engagement were the 
least controversial point in the negotiations. It was generally agreed !bat the 
new force needed robust rules of engagement and wide-ranging authority to 
use force in order to prevent a repetition of the humiliating UNPROFOR 
experience. As cease-fire agreements had been broken repeatedly over the last 
few years, compliance with Dayton was not expected to be optimal. 
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Consequently, NATO would not only observe and monitor compliance with 
the peace agreement, it would also enforce it. There was also a general 
understanding that the 'dual key' command should not be repeated, and that 
the new force would be commanded by SACEUR exclusively. 
At closer range, the newfound NATO unity appeared to be rather fragile. 
Disagreements that arose during the peace negotiations indicated that not all 
transatlantic tensions had been alleviated. Some of the transatlantic 
disagreements in Dayton were notbing more !ban the usual squabbling 
between players who were looking to maximise leverage and minimise 
expenditure and risk. Such tensions were illustrated by disagreements over 
who was to oversee the planned elections, and the sharing of the financial 
burden of the peace implementation. However, at a more fundamental level, 
British negotiator Neville-Jones also admitted that 'policy differences between 
Europe and the US remain, albeit latent,' and that there was a very real risk 
!bat these could re-emerge. 177 
Perhaps the most difficult point was the minor role assigoed to the 
Europeans in Dayton, as the negotiations were, for all practical purposes, run 
exclusively by the Americans. The European allies were 'informed but not 
consulted' and their primary role was to assist as far as needed but not to 
interfere.'" Whereas the lack of US engagement had caused great fiustration 
in Europe during the war, the US solo-diplomacy from mid-1995 alienated 
many European governments. The US delegation, on the other hand, was 
fiustrated by the lack of cohesion lllllOng the Europeans, which in their view 
made the decision-making procedures too slow and cumbersome. 
But disagreement went beyond procedural matters. One example was the 
controversy about the relationship between the military and civilian peace 
implementation processes. During the peace negotiations, the Americans 
primarily focused on two closely connected issues: the division of Bosnian 
territory and the military implementation ofthe separation of the armies. 
According to Bildt, who had been appointed as leader of the civilian operation, 
the United States put its energy into drawing up a detailed description of how 
Bosnia was to be militarily and territorially divided.179 The Europeans, on the 
other hand, paid more attention to the civilian implementation and 
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constitutional arrangements, which were to build bridges across the lines of 
separation between the two entities. It is not easy to say whether these 
differences merely reflected a division of labour between the Americans and 
the Europeans, or more profound conflicting views on the peace settlement. 
An initial disagreement regarding the overall purpose ofNATO's deployment 
reflected two fundamentally differing views on how peace should be created 
in Bosnia. The original US implementation plan, presented to NATO in early 
September 1995, proposed that a NATO force, with broad mandates for the 
use of force, should be deployed only on Federation territory, and should 
remain in Bosnia until the Federation army had been sufficiently rearmed to 
defend itself.180 Even though the US administration abandoned this plan, after 
pressure from the Europeans and the State Department, 181 the idea materialised 
again in the 'train and equip' programme, which was negotiated exclusively 
between the US and the Federation government. The Europeans strongly 
opposed the programme, which consisted of US military aid to the Federation. 
According to its advocates, who were largely situated in Congress, the 
purpose of the 'train and equip' programme was to level the field and create a 
balance of power within Bosnia-Herzegovina, which in turn would allow the 
Americans to withdraw their forces within a relatively short time frame. 182 
This view differed radically from that of the Europeans, who feared that 
arming the Federation forces would encourage them to restart the war, and 
that NATO's impartiality would be jeoParrlised.183 
There was some disagreement regarding the co-ordination of the military 
and civilian implementation processes. Whereas the US military leadership 
wanted to limit the authority of the leader of the civilian peace process, the 
European military leadership advocated strong leadership of the civilian 
process. The European view was based on the UNPROFOR experience, 
which had demonstrated that most military issues had a political side to them 
as well.184 
Another point of disagreement was how to re-establish civil law and order 
in Bosnia. It was widely agreed that NATOIIFOR should not be given such 
tasks, and that there was a need for an international police force. The United 
States called for a robust force, which would enforce Bosnian laws and arrest 
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war criminals.1" The Europeans, on the other hand, argued that such a force 
would be difficult to establish within the short time available, and more 
importantly, that international law enforcement would be extremely difficult 
as long as the laws would be formulated and administered by the national 
authorities. An international police force could then end up in a situation where 
it had to execute laws with which it disagreed, and arrest war crimes 
suspects, knowing that the national courts were likely to release them 
inunediately.186 
The US focus on an exit strategy revealed a difference in the European and 
US approach to military operations 'other than war'. The latter tradition was 
influenced by the Vietnam experience, and centred on 'a deeply entrenched 
belief in the efficacy of technology and fire power ~ a means of minimising 
one's own casualties' .187 The Vietnam heritage was reflected in the US 
demand for an exit strategy, which in this case equalled a fixed exit date. In 
retrospect, the folly of a fixed exit date after a year-long operation, may seem 
striking. The problems connected to a fixed exit date were also pointed out 
bluntly by former US State Secretary, Lawrence Eagleburger, among others: 
'If you have a clear exit point in a place like Bosnia, it is like telling the parties 
that when our people get killed, we will leave. And that is exactly what the 
opponents of our presence would like. Instead of reducing the danger to our 
forces, it invites attack.' 188 But the US administration was under C!JDSiderable 
pressure from Congress, and from the fact that polls showed that 70 per cent 
of the population opposed the deployment of US troops in Bosnia. It was 
therefore unlikely that Congress would have approved the deployment of US 
troops without being reassured that the mission would only last one year, no 
matter how unrealistic this might have been. 
Congress' demand for an exit strategy was probably the main reason for 
the US insistence on the 'train and equip' program. As a bargaining point, the 
Republican leaders of the Senate and the House ofRepresentatives, Robert 
Dole and Newt Gingrich, threatened to withhold support of US participation in 
the implementation force on the ground, 189 and the House of Representatives 
voted 243-171 to withhold funding of US troops unless legislators specifically 
endorsed the mission.190 The Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, pledged 
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to consult with Congress on the matter, but stated prior to the Dayton 
negotiations that a US refusal to participate 'would be the end ofNato' ."' The 
fmal peace settlement was therefore a compromise, not only between the 
warring parties in Bosnia, but also between Europe and the United States and 
between the Pentagon, the State Department and Congress. 
The Dayton Agreement ended the period where NATO acted as an 
assistant to the UN. Neither of the organisations were likely to want to repeat 
the experience, recognising that their roles and operational procedures differed 
too much. However, through the adoption of a more independent role in 
international crisis management, NATO could not escape the need for 
legitimisation of its operations by an authoritative body like the UN Security 
Council. 
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1 995-1 999: Independent enforcer 
Introduction 
NATO's first fully independent 'out-of-area' operation was deployed to Bosnia 
at the end of 1995. Since then, NATO as such or some of its members have 
been directly involved in several 'out-of-area' conflicts. During 1996 and 
1997, NATO appeared to be stretched to its limits by the Bosnia operation. 
Consequently, internal instability in Albania and new confrontations with Iraq 
were handled through the traditional Cold War mechanism of ad hoc coalitions 
of the willing. However, the eruption of violence in Kosovo prompted a new 
joint NATO response, and this time NATO acted without UN authorisation. 
The air strikes against the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia (FRY) therefore 
marked the last step to date in the development ofNATO's new 'out-of-area' 
role. 
In this chapter, the experience of the first two years ofNATO's operation 
in Bosnia will be analysed. It will be argued that the overall lesson from this 
experience is that there are clear, and often underestimated, limits to what can 
be achieved by the use of military force in inter-communal conflicts like the 
one in Bosnia. Secondly, NATO's two other ways of handling 'out-of-area' 
problems will be analysed, through the experience of the ad hoc coalitions in 
Albania and Iraq, and the use ofNATO's new Partnership for Peace 
progranune (PfP) in Albania. It will be argned that by using these flexible and 
low profile means of intervention, NATO was able to avoid attaching the 
overall reputation of the Alliance to the outcome of an 'out-of-area' conflict. 
However, confronted with a new lmge-scale humanitarian disaster in Europe, 
NATO was compelled to launch several new 'out-of-area' operations, realising 
that the credibility and relevance of the Alliance would be measured against its 
ability to resolve the Kosovo crisis. 
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NATO's first out-of-area ground operation 
On 20 December 1995, NATO finally took centre stage in the international 
effort to end the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when NATO's Implementation 
Force (!FOR) replaced UNPROFOR. By the same move, the Alliance also 
took another step in the piecemeal development of an independent role for 
NATO outside its own treaty area. The new force was under the political 
direction of the North Atlantic Council, commanded by NATO's Supreme 
Allied Commander, and the majority of troops came from NATO member 
countries. After a gradual disentangling from UN command and control 
throughout 1995, NATO was finally in complete control ofboth ground and 
air operations in Bosnia 
NATO's first 'out-of-area' ground operation succeeded in ending the war 
in Bosnia. However, NATO's operation ran into many of the problems that 
UNPROFOR had faced. The most difficult challenge, how to impose a unitary 
state in Bosnia, proved to be as difficult fur NATO as it had been for the UN. 
The failure to do this gave rise to a new challenge as the peacekeeping 
operation had to be extended, first by 18 months and then indefinitely. 
Sustaining a considerable military engagement 'out-of-area' over a longer 
period proved to be difficult, and caused new tension between the United 
States and Europe. 
NIATO's mandate • peacekeeping or peace enforcement? 
The mandate for NATO's operation was set out in UN Security Council 
Resolution 1031, which was adopted on 15 December 1995. The Resolution 
marked a significant change in the relationship between NATO and the UN. 
Bearing in mind the experience ofNATO's support role in connection with 
UNPROFOR, NATO planners wanted to ensure that the Alliance would not 
find itself in a position where its ability to act was restrained by civilian 
interference in the chain of command. In order to prevent this, those parts of 
the Dayton Agreement to be implemented by NATO had been prepared by the 
Alliance's military planners, and were negotiated with the active participation 
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ofUS General Wesley Clark, who later became SACEUR. Consequently, 
Article I of Annex lA of the Agreement invited the UN Security Council to 
adopt a resolution authorising tbe establishment oftbe implementation force. It 
further stated that 'It is understood and agreed that NATO may establish such 
a force, which will operate under the authority and subject to the direction and 
political control of the North Atlantic Council through the NATO chain of 
command'.192 The Security Council responded by adopting Resolution 1031, 
authorising 
the member states acting through or in co-operation with the 
organisation referred to in Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreement to 
establish a multinational implementation force (!FOR) under the 
unified command and control in order to fo!fil the role specified in 
Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement. 193 
The same member states were also authorised to take 
all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure the 
compliance with Annex 1-A of the Peace Agreementm 
and to take 
all necessary measures, at the request of !FOR, either in defence of 
!FOR or to assist the force in carrying out its mission, and recognises 
the right of the force to take all necessary measures to defend itself 
from attack or threat of attack. 195 
What the UN Security Council really did was to relinquish UN authority over 
NATO's operation in Bosnia Hercegovina.196 Rosalyn Higgins has correctly 
argued that even though the degree of UN control has sometimes been a 
reality and at other times marginal, the arrangements for !FOR went one step 
further by delegating all political and operational control to NAT0.1" 
Furthennore, whereas UNPROFOR could only use force in self-defence, 
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!FOR was authorised to use force also in response to non-compliance with 
the commitments undertaken by the parties in the Dayton Agreement. Some 
observers noted 'the irony that NATO, an organisation that rightly prides itself 
in its military effectiveness, will now implement an agreement to which all 
parties have formally bound themselves, while the UN for more than three 
years has been called upon to keep a peace in the midst of a continuing 
war' .198 
However, overall, the !FOR operation differed quite radically from 
established peacekeeping principles. Even though it was based on consent 
inasmuch as all three parties had signed the peace agreement, all the parties 
signed under heavy pressure, and the Serb wartime leaders had been 
effectively excluded from the peace negotiations. It was therefore probable 
that compliance with the agreement would have to be enforced. Another 
important peacekeeping principle- that of impartiality - was formally in place 
in the Dayton Agreement, but in practice biased military and economic support 
to one of the entities entailed that the Bosnian Serbs were unlikely to see the 
peacekeeping force as impartial. The heavy involvement of major powers and 
the fact that costs in connection with the peacekeeping operation were borne 
by the participating nations individually also deviated from traditional UN 
peacekeeping principles. 
Obligations pursuant to the Dayton Agreement 
!FOR's primary task was the implementation ofthe military aspects of the 
peace settlement specified in Annex 1-A of the Dayton Agreement. Annex 1-A 
committed the signatories to 
72 
an immediate cessation of hostilities; 
redeployment of all forces behind a 4 kilometre-wide zone of separation 
along the agreed Inter-Entity Boundary Line within 30 days (with some 
exceptions where land areas had to be swapped); 
withdrawal of heavy weapons and forces to cantonment and barracks 
areas designated by !FOR within 120 days. 199 
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These measures were to be enforced by !FOR. 
In addition, !FOR would have the right (not obligation) to fulfil 'supporting 
tasks, within the limits of its assigned principal tasks and available 
resources' .100 Among the supporting tasks that were to cause the greatest 
difficulties were: 
to help create secure conditions for the conduct by others of other tasks 
associated with the peace settlement, including free and fair elections; 
to observe and prevent intetference with the movement of civilian 
populations, refUgees, and displaced persons, and to respond 
appropriately to deliberate violence to life and persons. 201 
If necessacy these tasks were also to be implemented through the use of 
force. 
However, these tasks were only one part of the Dayton Agreement, which 
included inconsistencies and some outright contradictions.202 Ivo Daalder of 
the National Security Council staff, who was responsible for co-ordinating US 
policy on Bosnia between 1995 and 1997, correctly observed that the Dayton 
Agreement remained ambiguous on the core issue ofBosnia's identity.203 This 
ambiguity was reflected in the military and civilian implementation procedures, 
which were strictly separated. Whereas the purpose of the military tasks was 
to separate the two armies and create a military balance between them, the 
purpose of the civilian arrangements was to build political institutions, which 
in the long run would integrate the two entities into one state. Representation 
in these bodies was to be based on ethnicity, which undermined the intended 
integrating effect of these structures. The allowance of triple citizenship (of 
either one of the Bosnian entities, ofBosnia itselt; and of a third state) not only 
acknowledged, but also reinforced the importance of ethnicity. These 
ambiguities would create serious problems for both the military and civilian 
implementation processes, and it soon became clear that it was impossible to 
treat them separately. 
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Implementation 
NATO's operation, Joint Endeavour, commenced on 20 December 1995. The 
deployment of 60,000 troops went relatively smoothly, and was met by no 
armed resistance. One of the most remarkable features of the operation was 
that eighteen non-NATO countries also placed their troops under NATO 
command. Russia was one of them. According to a special agreement 
between the United States and Russia, the Russian brigade was directly 
subordinated to a Russian deputy to SACEUR, and placed under the tactical 
control of the US-led sector in the north-east.204 
The implementation of the militaty aspects of the Agreement - the 
separation of the two armies along the Inter-Entity Boundary Line- was 
largely a success. The time limits were kept, and the cease-fire was 
respected. In retrospect, the lack of resistance to the militaty arrangements 
has led some to question whether 60,000 troops were excessive and 
unnecessary.205 The British negotiator, Pauline Neville-Jones, has argued that 
the Serbs were unlikely to put up any resistance, as they favoured partition, 
and hoped that it would become permanent. On the other hand, the fact that 
NATO's resolve was not challenged was probably connected to the 
demonstration of force. This in itself must have discouraged all parties from 
armed resistance, and a smaller force would not have had the same deterring 
effect. 
Regrettably, the success of the first 120 days did have some grave side 
effects. The most disappointing occurrence was, undoubtedly, the ejection of 
the Sarajevo Serbs from one of the remaining multi-ethnic areas in Bosnia. 
According to the Dayton Agreement, Sarajevo was within the Federation's 
territory. In compliance with the requirement to withdraw all troops beyond 
the Inter-Entity Boundary Line, the Serb forces located in four Sarajevo 
suburbs had to be withdrawn within 45 days after the signing of the 
Agreement, i.e. 3 February I 996. After a further 40 days (until 19 March}, 
Federation forces were to assume authority over the former Serlrcontrolled 
area. However, the Federation planned to close off the area as soon as 
possible and then move in with a large police force and conduct house 
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searches in order to register the entire Serb population. An internal report from 
JFOR and the International Police Task Force described the plan as 
•conscious ethnic cleansing based on terrorism' .206 As a result of the 
Federation's aggressive attitude, coupled with Serb propaganda and 
harassment, nearly the entire Serb population fled from the previously multi-
ethnic capital. Attempts to postpone the transfer of authority to the Federation 
were rejected by Washington, where the administration was determined to 
stick to the Dayton schedule."" The tragic event also dealt a serious frrst blow 
to NATO's reputation as an effective peacekeeper, as !FOR's commanders 
rejected the pleas for military intervention. 208 Instead of trying to provide the 
security required to encourage minorities to stay, !FOR's commanders chose 
to assist in the evacuation. Hence, whereas !FOR's implementation of the 
Inter-Entity Boundary Line was effective from a militaty point of view, it 
created almost I 00,000 new refugees, and completed the ethnic division of 
Bosnia. 
Finding a balance between 'mission creep' and 'mission 
cringe' 
The reasons for NATO's restrictive attitude to the supporting tasks which 
were listed in the Dayton Agreement was, primarily, the US emphasis on force 
protection, based on a well-grounded fear that US public support for the 
mission would evaporate if there were any US losses. Second, there was 
general concern that NATO would become entangled in non-military tasks, 
which it was neither equipped nor trained to handle, and which could 
undermine its ability to perform the military tasks effectively. !FOR's 
commanders had to find a balance between what Michael Pugh called 
'mission creep' and 'mission cringe', 209 that is between getting too involved or 
not getting involved enough. On the one hand, NATO was criticised for doing 
nothing more than assisting and segmenting ethnic cleansing, appeasing bullies 
and avoiding all the difficult but necessary issues connected to creating 
sustainable peace. It was argued that the Bosnia deployment resembled 
'nothing more than the moon landings, with the principal objective being to 
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send men far away and bring them back safely'. 210 On the other band, if 
NATO had become too heavily involved in the supporting tasks listed in the 
Dayton Agreement, it might have ended up in the same situation as 
UNPROFOR, with its resources being over-stretched, making it unable to 
perform its basic tasks effectively. 
At the heart of the matter was the question of how to apply force in order 
to impose peace. In fact, NATO ran into many of the same problems that 
UNPROFOR had encountered, and was eventually forced to adjust its 
operation accordingly. The first principle that had to be yielded was that of a 
fixed exit date. 
Changing the exit date 
In December 1995, Clinton promised that ifUS troops were deployed in 
Bosnia, it would be to fulfil a mission with clear and realistic goals that could 
be achieved within one year. The legacy of previous US missions which had 
been open-ended and based on vague and ambiguous goals, such as Vietnam 
and more recently Somalia, weighed heavily on the Clinton administration. At 
the outset, the official US argument was that the presence of a NATO 
peacekeeping force would, after one year, provide the Bosnians with a peace 
that they could then choose to sustain. The reasoning, although designed to 
gain Congress' approval ofUS participation in !FOR, seemed surprisingly 
naive. Believing that peace could be attained in such a short time following a 
· four-year brutal war with no cl~ar winner, which ended through a settlement 
forced upon the parties with no real consent, would mean disregarding the 
evidence of any number of peacekeeping operations in the past. However, the 
Clinton administration and the Defence Department in particular were 
probably genuinely concerned that an unlimited international presence would 
create a 'dependency culture' in Bosnia and remove the motivation for the 
parties to take responsibility for implementation of the DaytonAgreement 
themselves. 
Only six months into the !FOR operation, the problems connected with the 
US arguments could not be concealed. Four years of war had created deep 
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feelings of resenttnent and insecurity in the Bosnian population, which made it 
impossible to 'choose peace' after such a short period. The general elections 
in September only served to reinforce the division of the country along ethnic 
lines, as people voted largely in support of the hard-liners. When Robert 
Frowick, head of the OSCE mission in Bosnia, recommended that the 
municipal elections be postponed until the following year, 211 it became obvious 
that NATO would not be able to 'create peace' within one year, By the end of 
1996, US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General John Shalikashvili, 
admitted that the one-year limit had been a mistake and that previous 
statements as to when NATO would be able to withdraw had been far too 
optimistic. 212 As the !FOR operation was coming to an end, it became clear 
that a withdrawal according to schedule would ouly lead to a resumption of 
war. In that case, NATO's first 'out-{)f-area' operation would be seen as a 
complete failure. 
After months of speculation about an extension of the operation, the 
formal decision to stay a further 18 months was made soon after the US 
presidential election in November 1996. The follow-{)n force was given a new 
symbolic name- the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) - and was scaled down to 
some 30,000 troops. 
Status at the end of the first year 
!FOR's strict attitude to the many supporting tasks listed in the Dayton 
Agreement provoked heavy criticism of NATO throughout the first year. 
According to the US negotiator Richard Holbrooke, the commander of the 
operation, US Admiral Leighton Smith, chose to take a minimalist approach to 
all aspects of implementation, much to the frustration of both the Washington 
administration and those responsible for the civilian implementation process. 2" 
!FOR's effective presence prevented a new spring offensive but there were 
many important problems which remained unresolved. The two major ones 
were the continued freedom and influence of wartime leaders like Radovan 
Karadzic, and the threat to the civil security of ethnic minorities in all parts of 
the country. Several smaller problems were listed by the UN: 
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the large number of unauthorised weapons among the population; 
continued ethnic tensions-for instance in Mostar, where Bosnian 
Muslims had been evicted from their homes; 
illegal mobile check-points which prevented the freedom of movement; 
only 10-11 % of the known minefields had been cleared, and mines 
continued to hamper the freedom of movement and economic 
reconstruction. 214 
Even though these problems had not been mentioned in IFOR's mandate, 
there was a growing realisation that NATO would not be able to exit from 
Bosnia before these problems had been solved and a more stable peace had 
been established. 
SFOR - an extended interpretation of the Dayton 
mandate 
NATO's implementation of the Dayton Agreement changed radically during 
the second year of opemtion. Only a few months into the SFOR period, the 
mandate for the NATO force again became a matter of discussion in NATO. It 
had become obvious that NATO had done little to enhance or support the 
civilian peace building process, the success of which was a prerequisite for 
NATO withdmwal. IFOR had remained a bystander to civil law violations, and 
received much criticism for its passivity.215 The 18-month extension would be 
meaningless if the civilian measures in the DaytonAgreement were not 
implemented effectively. NATO's role in this process was to ensure secure 
conditions for the civilian agencies, to prevent interference with the freedom 
of movement, and to respond appropriately to delibemte violence to life and 
property. Consequently, NATO adopted a more active approach to its 
supporting tasks. Six months into the second year of opemtion, NATO's 
member states declared their intention to ensure that SFOR's mandate was 
carried out to the fullest At the end of 1997 the new approach was 
summarised by referring to new lines of action in a number of areas:216 
In August 1997, the head of the civilian implementation process in Bosnia, 
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Carlos Westendorp, requested NATO assistance to suspend or curtail the 
broadcasting of anti-Dayton propaganda. Consequently, SFOR took control of 
tmnsmitter sites used by the Srpska Radio in Pale in order to stop Serb anti-
Dayton propaganda. 
Also in August, SFOR announced a new policy for the control and 
restructoring of a paramilitary Special Police. SFOR's Opemtion Secure Beat 
was designed to ensure that these forces were disbanded and incorpomted 
into the armed forces or civil police. In November, SFOR took military action 
to shut down a non-compliant Special Police unit in Doboj. 
In September, SFOR, tempomrily reinforced by some 4000 soldiers, 
helped to ensure that the municipal elections took place peacefully. SFOR also 
provided substantial logistic assistance to the OSCE. 
From August, SFOR began to help the UN International Police Task Force 
to inspect police stations, confiscating thousands of unauthorised weapons. 
Besides these new tasks, SFOR continued to monitor a large number of 
weapon stomge sites. However, NATO's new active approach created new 
problems. 
Arresting war criminals 
As the IFOR mandate was coming to an end it became apparent that wartime 
beneficiaries were only waiting for the international force to leave in order to 
resume their criminal activities. These wartime leaders had nothing to gain 
from peace. On the contmry, many of them were facing charges of war 
crimes and if arrested, were likely to be sentenced to years in prison. As long 
as they, in pmctice, continued to run the Serb entity, a sustainable peace was 
unlikely. Using their influence to encoumge mistrust and hostilities, they 
effectively ensured that freedom of movement across the country and the 
right of refugees to return to their pre-war homes remained only rights on 
paper. 
The most public figure among these leaders was Radovan Karadzic, based 
in Pale in the north-east of the Serb entity. The leader of the Bosnian Serbs 
had been politically isolated since Dayton, and had been indicted for war 
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crimes by the International Tribunal for former Yugoslavia. However, it soon 
became obvious that Karadzic was still running the Serb entity in all but name, 
which hampered any steps towards reconciliation. Several sightings of 
Karadzic passing comfortably through IFOR check points had undermined the 
credibility ofNATO's commitment and caused an outcty in the Western 
press.217 However, NATO leaders were reluctant to initiate manhunts, for fear 
of retaliation and of undermining IFOR's ability to co-operate with both 
parties. Some of the IFOR forces had participated in UNPROFOR and 
experienced how the impartiality and credibility of the UN forces on the 
ground were undermined when NATO air strikes hit only one of the 
conflicting parties. NATO proved to be just as helpless as the UN in the face 
ofthis dilemma. 
Criticism ofNATO's inaction grew throughout the first months of the 
SFOR mission and by mid-1997 the character of the NATO operation had 
changed. On 10 July, British Special Air Service (SAS) troops surprised 
everyone by arresting one and killing another Bosnian Serb, both indicted for 
war crimes. Tensions increased following the arrest and there were several 
incidents involving explosions where international military and civilian staff 
were injured, but no one was killed. On 18 December the same year NATO 
made its second arrest of two Bosnian Croat war crime suspects. 218 However, 
the fact that important figures like Karadzic and the leader of the Serb army, 
Ratko Mladic, were not arrested showed that NATO had not found an 
effective solution to this problem. 
Use of force In support of democracy 
The continued prominence of Radovan Karadzic and his accomplices also led 
to active NATO support of his political opponent. In 1997, Biljana Plavsic 
established an alternative and more moderate leadership in Banja Luka, in the 
south-west of the Serb entity, and prior to the 1997 elections Plavsic entered 
into an open power struggle with the Pale group, headed by Karadzic. In 
August, NATO troops intervened directly in the struggle by taking control of 
several police stations in Banja Luka, replacing pro-Pale police officers with 
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officers loyal to Biljana Plavsic.219 Some weeks later, a similar incident led to 
attacks on NATO troops by Serbs loyal to Karadzic. 220 NATO also took 
control of radio and television stations which were broadcasting hardline 
propaganda, and in September NATO threatened to jam and even bomb the 
Pale broadcasting station. In November, SFOR again seized a police station in 
Doboj in the Serb entity in a move intended to punish hard-line Serbs who had 
been involved in clashes with rival police factions.221 
However, NATO's new activist approach caused a wide range of 
reactions, demonstrating the difficulties connected with imposing democratic 
goals by military means. Criticism ofNATO's new policy came from many 
angles. The New York limes pointed out that the use of force to control the 
media would make Bosnians 'doubt the difference between democracy and 
dictatorship' .222 The Russian NATO envoy, Vitali Churkin, used the same 
argument. 223 Moscow warned NATO against pressuring the Bosnian Serbs 
and threatened that intolerable use of force could imperil the whole mission.224 
Additional warnings referred to already strained NATO-Russia relations caused 
by NATO's decision to expand. If the Russian threats were credible, both 
Russian participation in IFOR and the fragile NATO-Russia relationship could 
be endangered by an extended use of force. 
Finally, NATO's new policy provoked counterattacks by Serb mobs. An 
attempt to seize several police stations in Brcko on August 28 collapsed when 
a well-{)rganised and disciplined crowd threw firebombs and attacked SFOR 
soldiers with thick wooden planks. 225 No firearms were seen or used, even 
though they were widely available.""' The Serbs were effectively exploiting the 
limits set by the mandate of the peacekeeping force, making sure that the 
heavily armed soldiers could not counter the attack from the crowd. As 
NATO's overwhehning force could not be applied against unarmed civilians, 
the SFOR troops were forced to retreat to their bases and thereafter resorted 
to mobile patrols of the town. 
In the final analysis, NATO was criticised if it fitiled to act against the 
hardliners, and if it sought to restrain them. On the one hand, ifNATO did not 
act to remove or pacifY individuals refusing to adhere to the Dayton 
requirements, there would be no peace. On the other hand, if NATO went too 
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far in imposing its will, it would soon end up as the enemy. Besides the 
obvious threat to the security of its troops, its credibility as a peace force 
would be imperilled, as the general support for the hard-liners would then 
increase, resulting in a lack of support for the peace process. 
Use of force to provide civil security 
NATO was also criticised forfuiling to provide common security for the 
Bosnian population. The ejection of the Sarajevo Serbs was only the first of 
many incidents in which military force proved ineffective in solving civil 
security problems. According to the Dayton Agreement, the safety of the 
population was primarily the responsibility of the local law enforcement 
agencies. However, the police forces had been heavily involved in the war, and 
consisted partly of paramilitary forces in police uniforms, and were by no 
means neutral actors. In the hostile climate that persisted after Dayton, the 
police forces were unlikely to provide security for certain groups, for instance 
ethnic minorities reclaiming their pre war homes in areas held by the other 
group. 
As a result of the war, there were several hundred thousand refugees and 
internally displaced persons inside and outside Bosnia. According to the 
Dayton Agreement, these people had the right to retorn to their homes. The 
difficulties connected to NATO's supporting role in this process were 
demonstrated in several similar incidents in early I 997. In a typical situation, 
unarmed mobs would harass retorning refugees or burn their houses. As long 
as the crowds were unarmed and no civilian lives or SFOR troops were 
directly threatened, the situation was judged to be outside SFOR's mandate. 
Instead of intervening directly in these incidents, NATO chose to increase its 
presence in the area in order to defuse tensions for a while. By doing so 
NATO was able to prevent the resurgence of war, but not to create the 
conditions necessary for the safe retorn of refugees. 
In February I 998, the United States, responding to the unresolved law 
enforcement problem, proposed that a I ,600-strong armed 'paramilitary' 
force should be established for the main purpose of undertaking tasks such as 
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crowd control. The establishment of a 'robust' police force was advocated by 
the US administration already at Dayton and had since then continued to 
reappear on the NATO agenda. However, NATO was unable to agree on the 
issue. 
A specially ~ned police force would have been better prepared to handle 
such problems than NATO but the more fundamental problems connected to 
the law enforcement responsibilities would hardly have been solved by 
replacing one type of force by another. First, such a force would have had to 
enforce laws created by Bosnian legislators. This meant that the force would 
have to enforce laws which may have been unacceptable by Western norms 
and standards. Furthermore, they would have to hand violators over to the 
local courts, whose practice may also conflict with Western norms. In other 
words, by taking on a law enforcement role, the so-called international 
community would enforce legislation over which it had no influence. 
Imposing peace 
As described above, the supporting tasks set out in the Dayton Agreement 
proved to be extremely difficult for NATO, partly due to a lack of technical 
skills and training, and partly because the use of force to achieve these goals 
could sometimes even be counterproductive. Until the Bosnia operation, 
NATO had been a combat organisation, trained and equipped for fighting 
large-scale wars. The organisation was inexperienced in civil-military co-
ordination and unprepared for tasks like riot control. In spite of a broadly 
defined mandate to use force in order to ensure compliance with the peace 
agreement, there was no enemy to beat in Bosnia. Above all, casualties among 
the local population had to be kept to a minimum, out of concern for both the 
security of SFOR troops and continued support for the peacekeeping 
operation from the Bosnian population, preferably on both sides of the division 
line. Due to these restrictions, an effective military alliance with an 
overwhelming force at its disposal proved unable to perform at least two main 
tasks that were expected of it. 
In March I 997, NATO was harshly criticised for its inability to prevent 
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recurrent violent episodes in Bosnia. The Washington Post commented that 
NATO appeared as ineffective as the UN troops, which had been widely 
criticised for failing in their peacekeeping mission previously. Morton 
Abramowitz, the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, when reflecting on the evolving debate over NATO expansion and the 
evolving Albanian disintegration in 1997, commented that NATO appe_ared to 
be good at dealing with problems that didn't exist but showed great difficulty 
in facing up to the destruction at its doorstep.227 Well into the second year of 
its first 'out-of-area' ground operation, the relevance of the Alliance in the 
post-Cold War era was again questioned. 
Abandoning the exit date policy 
Despite the postponement of the first exit date, the belief in a fix~d date 
for departure seemed deeply entrenched in the US defence estabhshment. 
The new Defence Secretary, Williarn Cohen, seemed determined to stick 
to the new timelimit and stated firmly in his confirmation hearings that US 
troops would withdraw from Bosnia by mid-1998 at the latest. General H. 
Hugh Shelton, nominee to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
reiterated the argument as late as September 1997. However, under 
Cohen 's first visit to Europe in March 1997, his suggestion of a European 
follow-on force after SFOR was firmly rejected by the Europeans. 
Michael Portillo, the British Defence Minister, expressed the European 
policy with the slogan: 'In together, out together' .228 The Europeans w~re 
determined to avoid a repetition of a situation similar to UNPROFOR wtth 
European troops on the ground and US calls for a tougher policy at a safe 
distance. The first indication of a shift in US policy came in May when 
Clinton, during a visit to Europe, stated that he wanted to stop talking 
about an exit date and start talking about what had to be done before 
NATO could leave Bosnia."' Independent US commentators also pointed 
out the problems connected to the fixed exit date policy. The Clinton 
administration's policy was criticised for showing 'an extraordinary 
concern about casualties, at least as much emphasis on getting out as 
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getting in, and at least as much emphasis on what you are not going to do 
as what you are going to do'.'30 It was argued that US policy would 
ultimately mean that US participation in future peacekeeping missions was at 
the mercy of local factions. Any faction wanting to get rid of the 
peacekeepers in order to resume fighting just had to out-wait the 
peacekeepers' departure or, alternatively, to target US soldiers in order to make 
this happen. At the same time, the Clinton administration had initiated the 
debate on NATO expansion. Political commentators asked rhetorically what, 
precisely, was to be expanded - referring to NATO as a 'toothless, spineless 
version of the Washington DC motor vehicle bureau, a bureaucratic labyrinth 
in which paper goes in and never comes out'."' 
The municipal elections in Bosnia in September left little hope for an 
easy exit for the international force. Even though a slightly reinforced 
SFOR had prevented violent episodes during with the elections, the results 
showed that Bosnia remained as ethnically divided as ever. In October, 
several options involving US presence on the ground beyond mid-1998 
were discussed by the US administration. The weightiest argument for 
prolonged US participation was that the United States could not retain 
operational command of the force if it had no troops on the ground. 232 
Control ofNATO's most important operation would thus have to be taken 
over by Europe, and the US' leading position in NATO would effectively 
be undermined. As the second deadline drew nearer, the arguments of the 
Clinton administration changed completely. In a testimony to the House 
Committee on International Relations on 12 March 1998, Defence Under-
Secretary, Waiter R. Slocornbe, argued that a civil war in Bosnia would 
threaten US national interests."' Furthermore, this civil war could easily 
spread and endanger the interests of allies such as Greece and Turkey, and 
could also threaten the credibility and unity ofNATO as it had once 
before. Therefore, there would be 'No artificial deadlines, but benchmarks 
to focus efforts, measure progress, and permit steady reduction in force 
levels'. Three 'benchmarks', in particular, were mentioned; I) a 
restructured, integrated and retrained local police force with a capacity to 
deal with civil disorder; 2) a phased and orderly process for the return of 
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refugees and displaced persons, also to minority areas; 3) the regaining of 
media control from hard-liners. 
Transatlantic burden-sharing In Bosnia 
Many of the problems discussed above were related to an ongoing debate 
about burden-sharing between the United States and its European allies. The 
burden-sharing debate had taken place since the establishment of the Alliance, 
both in connection with the engagement of some allies in conflicts outside 
Europe and defence of own territory. Transatlantic tension over this issue 
erupted again in May 1996 when the chiefUS and British.negotiators at 
Dayton, Richard Holbrooke and Pauline Neville-Jones, hl\d a public row over 
who was to blame for the lack of progress in the civilian implementation 
process.'" Burden-sharing continued to be an issue throughout the operation, 
and came to the fore again in the discussion of a European follow-on force 
after June 1998. When presented with a supplementary defence budget 
request in March 1998 which was linked to US operations in Bosnia and Iraq, 
members of the Senate Appropriation Committee expressed dissatisfaction 
with the contributions of the allies. The Committee's chainnan, Ted Stevens, 
announced plans for a trip in order to explain to the allies that Congress might 
call for withdrawal from some operations if the United States did not receive 
more help from Europe.'" 
From the European perspective, on the other hand, Dayton was primarily a 
'US-designed agreement' which Washington was not free to 'dump on others 
to implement at a time of their choosing'. 236 It was pointed out that Europe 
and other partners had provided three times as many troops as the United 
States in Bosnia, five times as much economic assistance, nine times as many 
international police personnel, and received ten times as many refugees. 
However, even though the Americans were eager to make the Europeans 
carry a greater part of the burden, they were reluctant to relinquish their 
control of the operation. Defence Under Secretary, Waiter Slocombe, argued 
that '[i]t is clear that NATO must continue to lead that force. No other 
institution could do so effectively. And America, as the leader ofNATO, must 
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participate in that force, because the record shows that the U.S. has to join in 
any such force if it is to be successful. '237 
Lessons learned from the IFORJSFOR experience 
The historic importance of the NATO operation in Bosnia has been underlined 
repeatedly, being 'NATO's first-ever ground force operation, its first-ever 
deployment 'out of area' and its first-ever joint operation with NATO's 
Partnership for peace and other non-NATO countries. '238 It has been hailed as 
'tangible proof' that 'NATO's military forces have the flexibility to be used 
outside the NATO area, for operations under the authority of the UN Security 
Council'. 239 However, the operation has also revealed some of the limits of 
NATO's ability to conduct peace operations outside its own territory 
First of all, imposing peace by military means has proved to be almost as 
difficult for NATO as it was for the UN. Three-and-a-half years into the 
operation, Bosnia looks as divided as ever, and the prospect of a swift 
withdrawal seems remote. Whereas military force can be used to separate 
armies, it is incapable of reconciling warring parties and even of providing 
civil security and freedom of movement as a basis for reconciliation. If 
NATO's operation in Bosnia continues indefinitely, the problem of sustaining 
manning requirements for long-term 'out-of-area' deployments may become 
acute. As recognised by Deputy SACEUR, General Sir Jeremy MacKenzie, 
'the alliance is big enough to deal with contingencies. But it is not really good 
for long-haul operations. '240 Furthermore, compared with other peacekeeping 
operations, NATO's operation in Bosnia has been very intensive and therefore 
also very expensive. It has been argued that providing and funding forces of 
this dimension and sophistication is probably not sustainable as a general 
approach to peacekeeping. 241 It may be neither desirable nor necessary for 
NATO to undertake traditional peacekeeping operations based on minimum 
use of force which the UN is capable of performing. 
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NATO's out-of-area engagement after Dayton 
Since the establishment ofiFOR in December 1995, NATO has faced several 
new challenges in the form of conflicts erupting within the sphere of interest 
of at least some ofNATO's members. In response to these conflicts NATO 
has adopted strategies ranging from 'hands-Qff' in Albania in 1997 to a large-
scale bombing campaign againstthe Federal Republic ofYugoslavia in 1999. 
NATO's response to 'out-Qf-area' conflicts over the last few years can be 
divided into three broad categories: NATQ-Qperations as such, coalitions of 
the 'able and willing', and assistance through Partnership for Peace. The 
advantages and disadvantages connected with each of these will be briefly 
discussed below in the light of the experiences of the last few years. 
Coalitions of the able and willing: Albania 1997 
NATO's first 'out-Qf-area' challenge afler its deployment in Bosnia came from 
Albania, a country bordering two ofNATO's members. In March 1997, not 
long afler the controversial extension of the !FOR mandate by another 18 
months, Albania disintegrated into chaos and anarchy. Immediately thereafler, 
Albanian refugees started pouring into Italy. IfNATO's declaration ofits 
willingness and capacity to intervene outside its own area was to be credible, 
one would think that it had to encompass conflicts so close to NATO's own 
area. However, NATO intervention did not appear to be a realistically 
considered option. 
Instead France, Greece, Austria, Spain, Denmark, Turkey and Romania 
joined Italy which led the establishment of a Multinational Protection Force for 
Albania. The ad hoc coalition was given a mandate by the UN Security 
Council, authorising 
88 
Member States participating in the multinational protection force ... to 
... facilitate the sqfe and prompt delivery of humanitarian assistance, 
and to help create a secure environment for the missions of the 
international organisations in Albania. m 
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Compared with !FOR, the force which consisted of approximately 6,000 
troops was given a strictly limited mandate. It should neither disarm rebel 
factions, nor protect the Albanian population against any threats. Its mission 
was to ensure the safe delivery of humanitarian aid. Force should only be used 
'to ensure the security and freedom of movement of the personnel of the said 
multinational protection force'"''- i.e. ouly in self-defence. In this respect, the 
mandate was similar to the much-criticised UNPROFOR mandate. 
Operation Alba was deployed inAlbania in mid-April1997. The original 
three-month mandate was extended once by 45 days, 244 and the force 
withdrew on the expiration date on 12 August 245 The operation was largely 
regarded as a success, as internal riots settled down without any major 
incidents between the force and local factions. The force kept a low proffie 
and did not attempt to promote any political solution to the Albanian anarchy. 
It was criticised for paying too much attention to its own security, only 
arriving at conflict spots afler the local gang wars had been settled. 246 
Regardless of its actual achievements, Operation Alba was significant in 
that it was an attempt to launch a third approach to peacekeeping. With the 
UN still discredited by UNPROFOR and NATO preoccupied in Bosnia, a third 
solution was found in the establishment of a coalition of 'the able and willing'. 
This was in many ways a return to the Cold War solution of ad hoc coalitions 
assembled for a specific and limited purpose. The only remarkable thing about 
this solution in the post-Cold War era was that both NATO and the WEU had 
declared their willingness to undertake exactly these types of tasks. In this 
respect, Operation Alba was a considerable blow to the credibility of the 
WEU's claim of an independent peacekeeping role, as well as to NATO's new 
Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).247 Even though it could be argued that 
Operation Alba, to all intents and purposes, if not in name, was a CJTF,248 it 
was remarkable that NATO deliberately chose nnt to have its name attached to 
the operation in any way. The most likely explanation was that NATO's 'out-
of-area' capacity was stretched to its limits by the Bosnia operation, and that 
the conflict was not considered serious enough by several NATO members. A 
new NATO operation would have raised the question of US participation and 
leadership, and it was unlikely that the US Congress would have accepted 
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another ground deployment in Europe so closely after the decision to 
extend the !FOR operation. All in all, there was simply not enough 
'common alliance interest' to justify NATO intervention. 
At the time, the 'Albania-solution' -an ad hoc coalition of the willing-
seemed the most viable alternative for future engagements by NATO's 
members outside the treaty area. The large operation in Bosnia began to 
appear as a 'once in a lifetime experience', unlikely to be repeated in the near 
future. The risks attached to linking NATO's reputation to the outcome of 
complex internal conflicts, and the difficulties of establishing a common 
NATO policy in such operations, implied that more flexible coalitions would 
probably be preferred in the future. At the same time, however, it was also 
evident that ad hoc coalitions had some limitations. First, if too much of the 
NATO members' military engagement took place outside the NATO 
framework, integrated NATO structures could be undermined in the long run, 
and questions about NATO's relevance could resurface. Second, if 
humanitarian conditions in Albania had deteriorated further, NATO could not 
have escaped calls for a more forceful intervention, being the only 
organisation with such a capacity. This point was effectively proven in 1999 
when the flow ofKosovo-Albanian refugees into north Albania created a 
humanitarian disaster and a highly volatile situation in the border area between 
Albania and the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia. In response to this situation, 
NATO rapidly established a NATO-ledAihania Force (AFOR), consisting of 
6,000 troops, tasked to assist the humanitarian operation and to stabilise the 
situation in the border area. Thus, what had seemed impossible in 1997, was 
implemented without much discussion in 1999. Whereas NATO's 'out-of-
area' capacity had appeared stretched to its limits in 1997, it proved to be quite 
flexible when the situation in Alhania became more severe. 
Partnership for peace- a viable supplement to out-of-area 
operations? 
Following the withdrawal of the Multinational Protection Force in August 
1997, NATO became more directly involved in Albania, though nut through a 
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joint military operation. Instead, NATO's new programme for co-operation 
with former East-block countries was invigorated. Partnership for Peace 
(PiP) had been introduced at NATO's summit in January 1994. Originally 
accused of being desigoed to keep aspiring members at a comfortable distance 
without shutting them completely out in the cold, the programme could easily 
have become a paper tiger. However, in Albania PfP provided a flexible 
framework for a less ambitious and more anonymous NATO involvement in a 
volatile situation right outside NATO's borders. Through PfP NATO could 
become involved in Albania without investing its overall reputation and 
credibility in one operation, as it had been forced to do in Bosnia. 
The Albanian PfP programme comprised defence-related bilateral 
assistance from NATO members and Partner countries (other members of 
PfP) and NATO assistance as such. PfP exercises were also conducted in 
Alhania, making NATO's presence temporarily more visible. Partly in response 
to the eruption of violence in Kosovo and subsequent Albanian uneasiness, 
NATO approved an Individual Partnership Programme for Albania in May 
1998. The programme covered 'inunediately relevant' activities, such as the 
reinforcement of border forces with equipment, means of transport and 
communication, the security of munitions and weapons dumps, and the 
evaluation of Albanian's potential needs by a NATO civil emergency 
assessment team in case of a further deterioration of the situation. NATO was 
also to send eight teams of experts to Tirana to help restructure the Alhanian 
forces.'" 
Although the primary goal of the ptp assistance to Albania was to promote 
internal stability, NATO also used the ptp framework to send sigoals to 
Albania's neighbour Yugoslavia. In connection with the growing tension in 
Kosovo, NATO increased its activities in Albania, hoping that a demonstration 
of force in the region would deter Milosevic from further harassment of the 
Kosovo-Alhanian population. 
Whereas NATO clearly failed to achieve this last goal, the enhanced use of 
ptp assistance to Albania contributed, at least temporarily, to internal stability, 
and to preventing the crisis in Kosovo from spreading to neighbouring Alhania. 
All in all, though far less noticeable than NATO's other 'out-of-area' activities, 
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the PfP programme has probably contributed significantly to the enhancement 
of stability in Eastern Europe by engaging aspiring NATO members in 
pmctical militaiy co-opemtion with the Alliance. 
Iraq • the global role of the United States and NATO allies 
The next incident involving a militaiy response by some ofNATO's members 
was caused by the expulsion of US inspectors participating in the UN Special 
Commission's (UNSCOM) surveillance programme in Imq in late October 
1997. After a few fruitless diplomatic rounds, the United States and Britain 
threatened to use force against Imq if Saddam Hussein continued to deny 
UNSCOM free access to suspected weapons sites, and started to build up 
forces in the Gul£ A confrontation was tempomrily avoided as the UN 
Secre!aly Geneml was able to negotiate a Memomndum of Understanding 
(MoU) with lmq, assuring UNSCOM's access. However, in December 1998 
the chief UN inspector, Richard Butler, concluded that Imq had continued its 
obstruction of UNSCOM's work, and the United States and Britain launched a 
first wave of air strikes against Imq in Opemtion Desert Fox. 
Like Opemtion Desert Storm in 1991, Desert Fox was not a NATO 
opemtion, and the lessons to be learnt about NATO's 'out-of-area' capacity 
are perhaps few. Most significant was the filet that, as in Albania the previous 
year and in the Gulf War in 1991, NATO intervention never became an issue. 
Opemtion Desert Fox followed a familiar Cold War pattern of an ad hoc 
coalition of the 'able and willing'. However, a comparison between Opemtion 
Desert Storm and Opemtion Desert Fox also reveals some striking 
differences. Whereas Opemtion Desert Storm was conducted by a broad 
international coalition with a clear mandate from the UN Security Council, 
Opemtion Desert Fox had only two participating countries. The question of 
whether the opemtion was properly legitimised by the UN was highly 
contested, and important members of the 1991 coalition, such as Fmnce and 
Russia, did not support the new opemtion in 1998. 
The UN Security Council resolution of March 1998, which approved the 
Memomndum ofUnderstartding between Imq and the UN, was delibemtely 
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ambiguous, reflecting clear disagreement over the question of use of force. 
Acting pursuant to Chapter Vll of the UN Charter, the Council endorsed the 
MoU, and stressed that any violation of the demand for 'inunediate, 
unconditional and unrestricted access' fur UNSCOM, would have the 
'severest consequences for lmq' .250 According to US interpretation, the 
resolution was 'drafted so it is perfectly clear that any member can take 
unilateral action if it feels there is a grievous violation' .251 This interpretation 
was coutested by Russia, Fmnce and China which argued that the resolution 
meant that militaiy action against Imq could not be taken without the adoption 
of a new resolution in the Security Council.'" When the United States and 
Britain finally decided to launch air strikes against Imq they argued that they 
were acting in response to an Imqi breach of Security Council resolution 687 
from 1991.253 This seven-year-old resolution had dictated the conditions for 
peace following the Gulf War. However, the resolution only authorised use of 
'all necessary measures' in connection with a violation of the Kuwaiti-Imqi 
border. 254 The mandate to establish UNSCOM was issued in the same 
resolution, but there was no direct reference to a response in case of Imqi 
obstruction of this part of the resolution. The legal grounds for militaiy 
intervention were therefore disputed, and the decision to launch the opemtion 
in spite of this indicated disillusionment with the post-Cold War hopes for an 
expanded role for the UN Security Council. 
The air strikes did not succeed in changing Imqi policy, and by mid-1999 
the situation in Imq was still unsolved. However, the response to the 
resurgence of the Imqi crisis in 1998 indicated some lessons with regard to 
NATO's ability to act outside Europe. Despite the French decision not to join 
any militaiy strike against Imq"' the overall impression was one of broad 
support from most NATO allies. Fmnce's decision to oppose the attacks 
obstructed complete allied cohesion, but the situation did not escalate into 
large-scale conflict, in which case the French decision to oppose its allies 
could have proved much more difficult to sustain. On the other hand, very 
few allies participated in the actual opemtion, which implied that the militaiy 
and financial burden had to be shared by the United States and the United 
Kingdom alone. The most significant change since 1991, however, was the 
DEFENCE STUDIES 5/1999 93 
very limited support for the operation from the rest of the world. Thus, in 
most aspects, Operation Desert Fox resembled 'out-of-area' operations 
conducted by NAlD members during the Cold War. 
Kosovo- going to war against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia 
Following the Albanian and Iraqi crises, which were both handled outside the 
NATO framework, the favoured alternative for future responses to 'out-of-
area' conflicts appeared to be ad hoc coalitions of the willing and flexible use 
of military assistance through PiP. However, the eruption of violence in 
Kosovo during I 998 and 1999 eventually led to the deployment of several new 
NATO 'out-of-area' operations. Most importantly, however, NAlD expanded 
its 'out-of-area' role even further through its decision to launch air strikes 
against a sovereign state without explicit authorisation from the UN Security 
Council. 
When the fighting between Serb military and police forces and the Kosovo 
Liberation Army (UCK) escalated in early 1998, NAC's first reaction was to 
express deep concern over the situation. The UN Security Council 
condemned 'the use of excessive force by Serbian police forces against 
civilians and peaceful demonstrators in Kosovo, as well as acts of terrorism 
by the Kosovo Liberation Army', and introduced a comprehensive weapons 
embargo against FRY (Resolution 1160, adopted 31 March 1998). As 
mentioned above, NAlD also intensified its pfp activities in Albania in order to 
enhance stability in the surrounding areas ofKosovo. However, the fighting 
continued, and in June 1998 NAlD instructed its military staff to assess and 
develop 'a full range of options with the mission ... of halting or disrupting a 
systematic campaign of violent repression and expulsion in Kosovo' .756 The 
same month NAlD conducted Exercise Determined Falcon in Albanian and 
Macedonian airspace. A total of 80 planes from 13 NAlD countries 
participated in the exercise, the objective of which was to demonstrate 
NATO's capability to project power rapidly into the region. 757 According to the 
British Defence Secretary, George Robertson, the exercise sent a 'clear and 
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unambiguous message' from NAlD to Milosevic to 'think again'."' However, 
NAlD's explicit and implicit threat to use force only seemed to stiffen the 
resolve of the UCK, which refused to negotiate any other solution than full 
independence. 
As media attention faded, the pressure on NAlD eased, and during the 
summer of 1998 Milosevic was allowed to pursue his repression of the 
Kosovo population more or less undisturbed. 759 However, 50,000 Kosovo-
Albanians were driven from their homes and when the humanitarian situation 
for the refugees deteriorated wi1h the onset of winter, criticism grew stronger. 
On 23 September, 1he UN Security Council was able to agree on Resolution 
1199 demanding a cessation of all actions affecting the civilian population, 1he 
safe return of refugees and free and unimpeded access for humanitarian 
organisations in Kosovo.260 If1hese demands were not met, 1he Security 
Council would consider 'further action and additional measures to maintain or 
restore peace and stability in the region'. 261 Despite obvious disagreement in 
1he Security Council over what 1hese additional measures should be, NATO 
decided to start preparations for air strikes against 1he Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY). At an informal meeting of defence ministers in Portugal the 
same week, NAlD issued anACTWARN decision which entailed that NAlD 
Commanders would begin to identizy the assets required for a limited and a 
phased air campaign in Kosovo.262 
Use of force was avoided once more when FRY accepted 1he deployment 
of1he unarmed civilian OSCE-led Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) to 
Kosovo. The Mission was !asked wi1h verizying that the parties adhered to UN 
Security Council Resolutions 1160 and 1199, and deployment began in late 
October 1998. KVM did manage to prevent an immediate humanitarian 
disaster for the 50,000 refugees, but its presence did not hinder an escalation 
of fighting in early 1999. The last attempt to reach a peaceful settlement failed 
when the negotiations in Rambouillet ended wi1hout agreement on 18 March 
1999. The following day, 1he OSCE chainnan, Norwegian Foreign Minister 
Knut Vollebrek, ordered 1he wi1hdrawal ofKVM, which was completed 
wi1hout hindrance from any of 1he parties the next day. Three days later, on 
24 March 1999, NATO commenced an extensive air campaign against FRY. 
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The campaign lasted for 78 days, until Milosevic accepted a peace 
agreement with NATO on 9 June 1999. The agreement was sanctioned by the 
UN Security Council in Resolution 1244 the day after. The outcome of the 
war was basically in line with the terms set out during the negotiations in 
Rarnbouillet. While Kosovo would remain a part of the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, the agreement and the resolution paved the way for the 
withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo, and for the deployment of the 
Kosovo Force (KFOR). 
1t is too early to draw any final conclusions from NATO's latest 'out-of-
area' operation. However, it is fair to conclude that the final, and from a 
NATO viewpoint reasonably successful, outcome stemmed first, from the 
ability to maintain a united front against the Milosevic regime. Secondly, the 
use of military force against FRY probably played an important role when 
Milosevic in the end accepted an agreement. At the same time, the air 
campaign revealed some dilemmas with regard to NATO's 'out-of-area' role in 
general. 
The first dilemma is connected with the potential effects of NATO threats 
to use force in order to intervene in a conflict between two external parties. 
Whereas threats to use force are intended to have a calming and deterring 
effect on an adversary, the effect may in fact be the opposite when the threat 
is made by an external actor against one party in an internal conflict like the 
one in Kosovo. By declaring a potential willingness to intervene, NATO 
increases the likelihood of having to do just that, as the weaker party in the 
conflict is likely to gain the most by NATO intervention. In fact, a NATO 
intervention may be its only option to achieve its political goals. The weakest 
party is thus likely to try to provoke a reaction by NATO through an escalation 
of the fighting, preferably involving civilian suffering, which is the least 
tolerable situation for NATO governments. On the other hand, and adding to 
the dilemma, ifNATO were to state that it was unwilling to intervene, the 
stronger party in the conflict would be likely to interpret this decision as a 
silent acceptance by NATO's members of the atrocities which follow in war. 
The third option of sending mixed signals - which is often chosen in lack of a 
better alternative- will most likely only fuel the hopes of both parties of either 
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being able to engage NATO or escaping NATO involvement. Consequently, in 
such situations NATO has to choose between options which all have different 
negative consequences. 
Another effect of the threat to use force is that NATO?s overall credibility 
will become linked to its ability to cany it through, and thus to the resolution 
of a conflict between two parties which may have inherently contradicting 
political goals. As summarised by The Economist, after NATO made its 
first threat to use force in response to the Kosovo crisis: 'If, after a final 
warning, Mr Milosevic fails to yield to NATO's demands, the alliance will 
have to send in the bombers or risk becoming a laughing-stock. Further 
indecision could turn NATO's summit in Washington next year- intended 
to endorse the expansion of the Alliance eastward and prepare for 
peacekeeping in the next century - into an embarrassing non-event. ' 26' 
This is not a NATO problem as such, but applies to all states or coalitions 
that threaten to use force. However, the fact that NATO is an alliance 
between 19 countries implies that the gap between the decision to issue a 
threat and the decision to actually apply it is widened. Ideally, the decision 
to use force if necessary, and an analysis of in what way and towards 
which goals, should be made before the first threat is issued. However, 
NATO's cumbersome decision-making procedures, and the difficulties of 
reaching internal consensus among 19 countries, makes it unlikely that the . 
· final decision to intervene will be made before the situation has become 
critical. Consequently, some of the members may agree to issue a threat 
without having fully considered the implications of canying the threat 
through. However, when the threat has been repeated several times the 
stakes may have been raised so high, making it virtually impossible for 
NATO to back down. As a result, NATO is inclined to become captured by 
statements issued before their implications were fully considered. 
One more permanent dilemma connected to NATO's 'out-of-area' 
interventions is the question of legitimisation in situations where the 
consent of the conflicting parties is lacking. In such cases, many would 
argue that NATO intervention would have to be authorised by the UN 
Security Council or the OSCE. However, in that case, NATO's ability to 
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act would become dependent on the consent of non-NATO countries, and 
the Alliance might in fact become completely paralysed. This brings us 
over to the future implications. of NATO's new 'out-of-area' role which is 
the subject of the next chapter. 
It is unlikely that the debate over whether NATO's decision to launch 
an air campaign against FRY was legitimate, and whether the campaign 
increased or diminished human suffering in Kosovo, will ever reach one 
final conclusion. The incompatible goals of the conflicting parties and the 
inherent difficulties connected to any attempt to settle such disputes should 
caution against simple answers. 
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Implications for the future 
This study has described NATO's incremental and unplanned adoption of a 
new role outside the Nortb Atlantic treaty area. The basic argument is tbat the 
Alliance's new 'out-of-area' policy has been developed through ad hoc 
responses to occurring events, and tbat the official policy statements were 
made after new policy had been put into practice on the ground. 
NATO's new Strategic Concept, adopted at the 50., anniversary summit in 
Washington in April 1999 was the latest document in line with this 
development. The bombing of the Federal Republic ofYugoslavia, which 
began in March 1999, had made it clear tbat NATO was willing to play a fully 
independent 'out-of-area' role and to attack a sovereign state without an 
explicit mandate from the UN Security Council. The 1999 Strategic Concept 
formalised this new policy by stating tbat the Alliance was 'to stand ready, 
case-by-case and by consensus, ... , to contribute to effective conflict 
prevention and to engage actively in crisis management, including crisis 
response operations'. 264 Previous references to support of operations under 
the authority of the UN or the OSCE were left out, marking NATO's 
independence of other international organisations in this issue. The 
geographical limits to NATO's new task were defined by a ~ference to 
enhancement of security and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area.,., However, 
the Concept also referred to the global context, listing acts of terrorism, 
sabotage, organised crime, the disruption of the flow of vital resources and 
uncontrolled movement of large numbers of people as security risks tbat 
might affect the Alliance. It was further stated tbat 'Arrangements exist within 
the Alliance for consultations among the allies under Article 4 of the 
Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts 
including their responses to risks of this kind'.266 The geographical limits to 
NATO's 'out-of-area' engagement are thus rather loosely defined. 
The implications of this expanded role are not easy to identify, as NATO's 
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'out-of-area' engagement affects almost every aspect of the Alliance. 
Furthermore, whereas conflicts in the Balkans are at the focus ofNATO's 
attention at the end of the 1990s, the challenges of the next decades may be 
completely different. Nevertheless, based on the experience gained in sevenil 
'out-of-area' operations during the last decade, three fundamental issues stand 
out as particularly important and deserve to be mentioned. 
The search for common alliance interests outside the 
NATO area 
In 1990 Manfred W!imer' asked for 'an internal Alliance understanding 
whereby ... the degree of engagement in dealing with a given [out-of-area] 
problem might vary from Ally to Ally, but the assets of the Alliance would be 
available for co-ordination and support.' Such an agreement has been hard to 
obtain. WOmer probably fully recognised the coming difficulties when he 
added that such an understanding could only operate in places or situations 
where common Alliance interests needed to be defended . ,., Despite the 
dramatic steps taken by NATO over the last few years, a quick glance at the 
world map reveals that common Alliance interests beyond NATO territory 
may be difficult to fmd. They are far from obvious in any part of Africa, and 
in most cases probably not vital enough to be considered 'in need of defence 
by the Alliance'. European participation in military interventions in East Asia or 
Latin America is also more than unlikely. In the Middle East all NATO's major 
members have vital interests, but they do not frequently coincide. Diverging 
interests may become more active and cause greater tension if a declaration of 
an independent Palestinian state is recognised by Europe but not by the United 
States. Moreover, the European reluctance to share what the United States 
sees as the burden of containing Saddam Hussein, could over time lead to 
considerable resentment in Congress.268 
Finally, NATO intervention in any of the many troublespots on the territory 
of the former Soviet Union would most likely provoke enormous resentment 
in Russia, and imply the risk of direct confrontation between NATO and 
Russia. This leaves the rest of the European continent as the most realistic 
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operational area for future NATO 'out-of-area' engagement. At the moment, 
the instability in the Balkans suggests that NATO will be fully occupied in the 
near future. The experience from Bosnia, where it took three years to agree 
on a common policy, suggests that it might be difficult to identifY common 
NATO interests even in this part of the world. On the other hand, it was 
firmly established in NATO's new Strategic Concept that the Alliance will play 
this role, and NATO's willingness to intervene at an early stage in Kosovo 
appeared to demonstrate this new-found agreement. 
Nevertheless, if 'out-of-area' operations are to become a primary NATO 
occupation in the future, the lack of common 'out-of-area' interests may 
slowly erode the 'underlying compact that binds North America to the fate of 
Europe's democracies' .269 An increased reliance on ad hoc coalitions of the 
willing is not likely to solve this problem. First, the Europeans are still 
dependent on US technical capabilities, such as airlift and intelligence, in large-
scale operations. Secondly, the policy of the United States - as the orily 
remaining superpower- is bound to have heavy bearings on any international 
event. Even in Bosnia, where the Americans chose to remain disengaged for a 
long time, US failure to commit to any of the peace plans before Dayton 
undermined the credibility of the peace negotiations. Due to this 'international 
law of gravity', some sort of transatlantic agreement is likely to be a 
precondition for any military intervention which may place the credibility of 
NATO or European troops at risk. Moreover, another powerful lesson from 
Bosnia is that equal exposure to threats, in terms of both loss of troops and 
military prestige and credibility, seems to be a precondition for being able to 
agree on a common policy. Consequently, 9 years after W6mer launched the 
idea of separable but not separate forces, NATO's new Secretary Genenil, 
Janvier Solana, stated his conclusion on this discussion at a conference on 
security policy in Munich in the first week of February 1998 as follows: 'Our 
operation in Bosnia has shown that we can make most progress if we act as a 
unit, not as a coalition of the willing. To act in solidarity should remain the 
rule, not the exception'.270 
However, whereas united action may be necessary to retain NATO 
cohesion, the need for a collective approach may effectively panilyse the 
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Alliance. The reluctance of the US Congress to place US troops in hann 's 
way has at times, as during the Bosnian conflict, been a major obstacle to joint 
NATO opemtions. Added to this problem is the US unwillingness to place its 
soldiers under non-US command by the UN or even other NATO members. If 
US troops are involved, the United States is likely to demand to be in 
command, which will only be acceptable to Europe if the US contribution is 
substantial. As a result, resentment may grow on both sides of the Atlantic 
over the distribution of influence and the sharing of burdens. 
Imposing peace 
The second major difficulty connected to NATO's 'out-of-area' engagement is 
the limit to what can be achieved through use of force in inter-communal 
conflicts, which have been predominant during the last decade. In such 
conflicts, the use of force is to some extent ineffective and, in the view of 
many, also illegitimate. This is not a NATO problem as such, but applies 
equally to all countries or organisations that try to intervene in this type of 
conflict However, the fact that NATO is an alliance of 19 (more or less) 
democmtic states may add some particular restmints on how force can be 
used. 
One obvious restraint on the use of force by most NATO members is 
domestic opinion's low tolemnce of civilian casualties and co!Iateral damage 
caused by NATO's actions. Moreover, this restraint will always be we!I 
known and probably effectively exploited by any opponent The stationing of 
mobile military targets inside towns and villages, or use of civilians as human 
shields can effectively paralyse or at least seriously hamper the effectiveness 
ofNATO. Even though tolemnce levels may rise mpidly ifNATO were to 
engage in a war on the ground, NATO is likely to be subject to such restmints 
also in war-like situations. 
A second restraining factor on NATO's ability to use force effectively is 
the low tolemnce of own casualties in out-of-area opemtions. In 1993, 
pictures of US soldiers being dmgged through the streets of Mogadishu made 
public support for US intervention in the civil war in Somalia evapomte 
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overnight. Since then, US preoccupation with force security has led to a 
heavy reliance on air power, which as already mentioned may have limited 
effect on events on the ground. 
Other problems connected with the use of force in such situations have to 
do with the chamcteristics of the conflicts, mther than NATO itself The 
resolution of these conflicts often involves reconstruction of an entire society, 
but whereas force can be used to monitor or enforce a cease-fire, it is fur 
more difficult to 'take military action to impose a unitary state'271 after civil 
war. As NATO experienced in Bosnia, it is both unacceptable and ineffective 
to apply military force against unanned civilians who are obstructing the 
peace process. The crude instrument of military force is simply not suited to 
this task. Moreover, providing civil security in war-tom societies has been one 
of the most difficult cha!Ienges in the new peace opemtions, and NATO is 
probably neither willing nor tmined to implement law and order in a society. 
Last, but not least, NATO's threat to use force in such conflicts may not 
have its intended calming effect. Quite to the contmry, NATO threats to use 
force against one of the parties may create a new dynamic in the war on the 
ground. The experience from Bosnia and Kosovo suggests that NATO threats 
to use air strikes against the Serbs altered the aims and stmtegies of the 
Fedemtion forces and the Kosovar-Alhanians, as provoking a NATO reaction 
became an important goal for both the Bosuian government and the leadership 
of the UCK. In order to achieve this, their aim became an escalation of the 
conflict Consequently, mther than having the calming and deterring effect 
NATO intended, threats to use force may just as we!I lead to intensified 
fighting. 
The question of legitimisation and NATO's relationship 
with the rest of the world 
At the risk of ending on an overly pessimistic note, one final difficulty 
connected with NATO's 'out-of-area' engagement must be briefly mentioned. 
The geographical limitations caused by a lack of common A!Iiance interests 
have already been pointed out. The preference for UN authorisation poses 
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equally strict geographical limitations on NATO's range of action. During the 
last months, NATO has made it evident through both practice and policy that 
UN authorisation is not required for NATO operations. Whereas the perception 
of the legality of such unauthorised operations may vary, the resentment 
caused in both domestic opinions and other parts of the world is 
unquestionable. The inability of the UN Security Council to agree on a 
common policy towards domestic or international conflicts is nothing new, 
but rather the normal situation. The question of legitimisation thus poses a 
serious dilemma for NATO. On the one hand unauthorised operations may 
undermine broad domestic support in many NATO countries and also 
undermine NATO's internal consensus as domestic opposition may vary 
between members. Another effect ofNATO's disregard of other countries' 
objections to its new role may be the stirring of anti-western feelings in the 
disiiiusioned populations of not only Russia but also Belarus and Ukraine. An 
'expanding and aggressive NATO' may in a worst~ase scenario lead to 
increased support for anti-western and anti-democratic candidates in future 
elections in these countries. On the other hand, always requiring a UN or 
OSCE mandate for an 'out-of-area' operations, would entail a de facto 
Russian or Chinese veto over NATO's decision-making process. 
Temporary transformation problems versus structural 
problems 
The discussion above has pointed to the many strains on NATO - on its 
internal cohesion, its military credibility and its relations with the rest of the 
world- caused by its new 'out-of-area' involvement. Less attention has been 
paid to the ability oftheAIIiance to survive strong disagreements and repair 
deep rifts in its internal relations and its relations with other countries. Despite 
the many difficulties encountered by NATO in the performance of its new 
role, support ofNATO membership remains high among the political 
establishments and public opinion in its member countries, and several new 
states are seeking NATO membership. It should also be kept in mind that the 
transformation process that NATO is currently undergoing normally would be 
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characterised by ad hoc decisions and 'learning by doing'. 
Furthermore, even though many lessons have been learned from Bosnia 
and more wiii be learnt from Kosovo, the challenges posed by the current 
conflicts in the Balkans may not resemble the security challenges of the next 
decade. The fundamental question of whether NATO's members have 
sufficient common interests to maintain the AIIiance in the absence of a 
unil)'ing external threat will to a large extent depend on the nature of these 
new threats, and NATO's ability to handle them. 
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